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Sammendrag
Oppgraderinger av overføringsnettet for elektrisitet kan forårsake reallokering av
samfunnsøkonomisk overskudd. Selv om det er mulig å bestemme en optimal plan
fra et overnasjonalt perspektiv fører endringene i fordeling av samfunnsøkonomisk
overskudd til at slike planer ikke nødvendigvis er optimale for de individuelle
nasjonene. Utvidelser av nettet i Europa blir i hovedsak planlagt av nasjonale
planleggere og det er en fare for at disse kan planlegge nettverksutbygging strate-
gisk for å maksimere sitt samfunnsøkonomiske overskudd.
Vi presenterer en modell med to nivå og tidsperioder. Modellen har en nettverk-
splanlegger som leder og et elektrisitetsmarked som følger. Vi sammenligner en
overnasjonal og en nasjonal planlegger. Den overnasjonale planleggeren maksimerer
samfunnsøkonomisk overskudd i hele markedet, mens den nasjonale planleggeren
maksimerer overskuddet i sitt land. Vi modellerer også to ulike kostnadsdel-
ingsmekanismer. I det første tilfellet betaler den nasjonale planleggeren alle kost-
nadene knyttet til oppgraderingene den planlegger. I det andre tilfellet ser vi på
bilateral kostnadsdeling. Modellen for den overnasjonale planleggeren reduseres
til et kvadratisk optimeringsprogram, mens den nasjonale planleggeren modelleres
med et Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) med en ikke-
lineær og ikke-konveks målfunksjon. Vi reformulerer komplementaritetsbetingelsene
som beskriver mulighetsområdet med en disjunktiv tilnærming. Modellene blir im-
plementert i GAMS og løst med solverne CONOPT og BARON. Modellene er
testet på et nettverk med fire og seks noder som representerer land i Nord-Europa.
Vi tester også modellen med tidsperioder som representerer årene 2010 og 2020.
MPECen løses til optimalitet for små instanser.
Resultatene illustrerer at ulike planleggere legger forskjellige planer som gir ulik
allokering av samfunnsøkonomisk overskudd. Løsningene for de nasjonale planleg-
gerne kommer nærmere løsningen til den overnasjonale planleggeren når vi intro-
duserer bilateral kostnadsdeling. Vi illustrerer viktigheten av å inkludere tidspe-
rioder for å kunne forlenge planleggingshorisonten ved å vise at en plan basert på
systemet i 2010 ikke lenger er optimal for systemet i 2020. Det bør forskes mer
på å forstå samfunnsøkonomiske reallokeringer som følge av investeringer i over-
føringsnettet og man bør bruke kunnskapen til å designe kompensasjonsmekanismer
for å gjøre overnasjonale planer akseptable for nasjonale planleggere.
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Abstract
Optimal transmission expansion plans can be determined from a pan European
point of view, but investments in transmission capacity are likely to cause re-
allocations of welfare. Thus the optimal plan determined by a supranational plan-
ner is not necessarily optimal for each individual nation. Moreover, network plan-
ning is mainly done at a national level in Europe. This makes it possible for nations
to plan investments strategically to maximize the welfare in their country.
We present a bi-level model with time periods to study national strategic invest-
ments in transmission infrastructure. The model has a transmission planner on
the upper level and an electricity market on the lower level. We compare a supra-
national planner and a zonal planner. The supranational planner maximizes the
welfare of the entire market and the zonal planner maximizes the welfare of her
zone. For the latter case we consider a situation where the zonal planner incurs
the full cost of the planned network upgrades and a bilateral cost sharing situation.
The model for the supranational planner can be reduced to a quadratic optimiza-
tion program, but the zonal planner is modeled using a mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and a non-linear and non-convex objective func-
tion. We reformulate the complementary constraints of the feasible region using
disjunctive constraints. The models are implemented in GAMS and solved using
the CONOPT and BARON solvers. We apply the models to a four- and six-node
network representing countries in Northern Europe, and time periods representing
the years 2010 and 2020. The MPEC is solved to optimality for small problem
instances.
The results illustrate that different planners create dissimilar optimal plans. The
various plans result in different allocations of social welfare, however the results
from the zonal planner comes closer to the supranational results when the costs of
transmission investment are shared bilaterally. The importance of time periods to
include a long term perspective in transmission planning models is illustrated by
showing that a plan for the current system state is no longer optimal in a future
system state. Research effort should be put into understanding the welfare real-
locations associated with network upgrades and compensation mechanisms should
be designed in order to make the supranationally optimal solutions incentive com-
patible for national transmission planners.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the EU Road Map 2050 the EU is committing to working towards a low-
carbon future. This decarbonization will require a transformation of the mix of
fuels used for power generation, increased energy efficiency and demand response
as well as expansions of the power transmission system. The EU is also seek-
ing to promote the free movement of the “four freedoms,” people, goods, services
and capital through the Internal Market or Single Market. Efficient infrastruc-
ture is required for the Internal Market to work for the electricity supply industry.
In particular, cross border interconnectors are needed to facilitate trade between
different nations. Congested interconnectors are limiting trade and give rise to op-
portunities for strategic behavior for various market players. Moreover increasing
transmission capacity in a meshed network is likely to cause re-allocations of social
welfare between countries.
As transmission planning is mostly done at a national level one could assume
that national planners will plan investment decisions to maximize the welfare in
their respective countries. Furthermore one could assume that different national
planners will provide dissimilar optimal plans and that these plans will differ from
a pan European optimal plan. We use the term national strategic for the possible
strategic behavior by nations when planning transmission expansions. Our use of
the term is similar to Huppmann and Egerer (2014).
Our thesis is motivated by the distributed nature of benefits arising from trans-
mission investments and the possibility of national strategic investments. We will
analyze this using a bi-level model for transmission expansion.
1
21.1 Main Contributions
Our master’s thesis has three main contributions.
1.1.1 An MPEC for Transmission Planning with Time Pe-
riods
We present a model with a transmission planner on the upper level and an electricity
market on the lower level. The transmission planner maximizes social welfare
defined as the sum of producer and consumer surplus, by investing in transmission
capacity. We consider both a supranational planner maximizing the welfare of all
nodes included in the market and a zonal planner which maximizes the welfare of
one zone. We utilize the aligning objectives of the upper and lower level to model
the supranational planner’s problem as a single level optimization problem. For the
zonal planner the objectives does not align and we present a mathematical problem
with equilibrium constraints to model the zonal planner’s problem. To include the
long term perspective of transmission investments we have added time periods to
the model.
1.1.2 Application of the Models on the Northern European
Electricity Market
We apply the model on a data set representing countries in Northern Europe in
2010 and 2020. The 2020 data is based on trends presented in The EU Energy
Trends to 2030 (European Comission (EC), 2009) and other reports. We compare
the solutions for a supranational planner, a zonal planner without cost sharing and
a zonal planner with bilateral cost sharing to a benchmark case which represents
the original market outcome without transmission investments. We highlight the
developments in welfare allocation.
1.1.3 Implementation and Solving of the Models in GAMS
Both the optimization problem representing the supranational planner and the
MPEC representing the zonal planner are implemented in GAMS. The optimization
problem solves easily for the problem instances we have tested.
The MPEC representing the zonal planner is non-linear and non-convex. We use a
disjunctive constraint approach to represent the complementary constraints of the
lower level and demonstrate that we are able to solve the problem to optimality
using the BARON solver (Sahinidis, 2013) in GAMS.
31.2 Overview of Thesis
This thesis starts by a brief discussion of some relevant themes to give some back-
ground knowledge and a review of related literature before we present two trans-
mission expansion models. The models are presented in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter
4 presents the model representing a supranational planner. This planner is maxi-
mizing the welfare for all nodes. Chapter 5 presents a model for a zonal planner.
This planner maximizes the welfare for an individual node. For this planner we
consider a situation where the node planning the investments incur all the costs and
a bilateral cost sharing situation where the costs of an interconnector are shared
by the countries on either side of the line.
Relevant data is collected and presented in Chapter 6 before we introduce the
implementation and results in Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 9 includes a discussion
of the limitations of the model and the validity of the results. We also translate
research insights into policy recommendations and give some suggestions for further
work before we give some concluding remarks in Chapter 10.
4
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Electricity
It is necessary to understand the physical characteristics of electricity and the
interactions in the value chain to understand electricity markets and the behavior
of the different agents. Some physical characteristics of electricity are discussed
in Subsection 2.1.1. Subsection 2.1.2 gives an introduction to the electricity value
chain and some background on the ongoing electricity market liberalization is given
in Subsection 2.1.3. The section concludes with an introduction to transmission
expansion issues in Subsection 2.1.4.
2.1.1 Physical Characteristics of Electricity
Electricity cannot be stored, meaning it has to be produced and consumed at the
same moment in time. The transportation of electricity requires physical connec-
tions, transmission lines. The flow on these lines is continuous, much like the flow
of gas in natural gas pipelines. The flow of electricity is determined by Kirchoff’s
current and voltage laws, and the flow pattern is determined by injections and
withdrawals at nodes. We have system effects in the sense that injections or with-
drawals at one node affects the flow in other parts of the network. Basically, this
defines an "unvalved" network where power flows on all possible paths between a
source and a sink. The flows cannot be directed. This leads to the problem of loop
flows. When electricity is supposed to be transported from A to B in a network
like the one illustrated in Figure 2.1, some will go directly from A to B, but some
will also go via C. These physical transmission limitations can be modeled using
the linearized DC load flow equations. This approach represents the AC grid with
5
6a DC-like representation1, resulting in a simplified representation of electricity net-
works, as resistances in the transmissions lines are neglected and voltage angles are
assumed to be small. However the loop flows are represented in a good way when
using the DC load flow approach.
Figure 2.1: Three node loop flow example
2.1.2 The Electricity Value Chain
The electricity value chain consists of suppliers of energy sources or fuels, gen-
erators, transmission system operators, distributers and final consumers. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: The electricity value chain
We usually differentiate between fossil and renewable energy sources. The various
energy sources have different degrees of variability and flexibility. Since electricity
has to be produced and consumed at the same moment in time, and electricity
demand is inelastic in the short term and varies through the day, week and season,
flexibility is a desired property of an energy source. When the power production
is flexible it is easier to match supply and demand. Variability is less desirable as
this makes the task of matching supply and demand more difficult.
Traditional thermal units are not variable, but have constraints like start-up costs,
restrictions on minimum up-and downtime and ramping restrictions, meaning they
are not very flexible either. When a turbine is turned on it will run until it is
turned off, but it takes time to turn it on and off. Due to their low variability and
1AC is an abbreviation for alternating current, and means that the flow direction of the electric
charge periodically changes. With a directed current (DC) the flow of the electric charge only
takes one direction. Power is usually distributed as AC, and this is the form the electric power in
regular houses is delivered. If the power is to be transmitted over large distances it will sometimes
be transformed in to DC.
7flexibility, thermal units with low marginal costs are usually used to cover the base
load. Thermal units with high marginal costs are usually used to cover peaks.
Hydro power is more flexible than thermal units. It is not very variable either,
however the generation output is proportional to the head, which will be reduced
if the reservoir is emptied. Thus the scheduling of hydro power has to take into
account the filling degree in the reservoirs. The reservoirs are filled by inflow and
rain and emptied when the water is used to produce power or if the reservoir
overflows. The power is sold at the electricity price. Thus hydro power planning
becomes a question of when to use the water to produce power in order to maximize
the value of the water, i.e the price the hydro power can be sold at. If the reservoir
is overfilled and the water flows over, the value of the water goes to zero. This
means the owner of the power plant would like to produce power when the price is
high, but at the same time make sure no water is lost due to overfilled reservoirs.
This results in a dynamic planning problem. Long term hydro power scheduling is
a stochastic dynamic optimization problem. This is described in Wolfgang et al.
(2009).
Wind and solar power are examples of variable generation. The generation from
these units is dependent on climatic factors. A wind farm produces power when
the wind blows and a solar power plant produces power when the sun shines. This
variability and lack of flexibility is difficult to handle in the power market. Wind
power in particular creates new flow patterns accross grids (Brunekreeft et al.,
2005). Furthermore the geographical location of these sources can be far from
consumption centers. This means increased transmission capacity will be needed
to transport the power from where it is produced to where it is consumed. Thus
increasing amounts of variable power in the power market increases the need for
transmission capacity.
The transmission system operator (TSO) is responsible for transmitting the elec-
trical energy from power producers to substations near the final consumers. The
distributers distribute power from the substations to the final consumers. The
transmission from power producers to substations is usually done at a high voltage
level, whereas the distributers transform the power to a lower voltage level before
distributing it to final consumers.
2.1.3 Electricity Market Liberalization
The ongoing liberalization of the world energy markets started in the late 1980’s.
These markets were formerly characterized by imperfect competition, but are now
in the process of being restructured into competitive industries. In practice lib-
eralization usually implies privatization and sale of state owned assets under the
assumption that privatization will improve economic efficiency (Kopsakangas and
Svento, 2012). Historically the generation companies were vertically integrated and
controlled both generation, transmission and distribution. With this vertical inte-
gration of the power sector investments in new interconnectors were mainly done
8to increase the reliability of the grid as economically as possible.
One important feature of the restructuring is the unbundling of the power system
in competitive and non-competitive parts. Electricity distribution is generally con-
sidered to be a natural monopoly due to economies of scale (Wangensteen, 2007).
Generation on the other hand is not considered to have significant economies of
scale.2 Thus the power markets were unbundeled into one competitive part com-
prising generation and consumption, and monopolistic transmission and distribu-
tion. Further, the network operators were obliged to allow third party access to the
infrastructure. This open access to the grid enables all generators and consumers to
use the grid for transportation. The grid now represents a physical marketplace for
competitive trade (Wangensteen, 2007). Thus an efficient and robust transmission
infrastructure is imperative for the liberalization of the power market. Insufficient
transmission capacity will adversely affect the degree of competition in the power
market. Green and Newberry (1992) addressed the issue of market power for Eng-
land and Wales where two players, National Power and PowerGen, were able to
offer supply considerably above marginal cost, and had the opportunity to exploit
the transmission grid constraints. The analysis suggested that market power were
underestimated by the government when designing the market. Lise et al. (2008)
use the static computational game theoretic model COMPETES to investigate
market power in the European electricity market and find that increased transmis-
sion capacity would lower the prices in countries with high prices and reduce the
impact of market power.
Liberalization of the power sector also causes new flow patterns across the grid when
consumers are able to chose their supplier. These grids were originally designed to
provide security of supply to countries with moderate imports. The new market
driven flows pose new challenges to the grid as it needs to accommodate more
market-responsive trading.
2.1.4 Transmission Expansion
In the previous sections we have seen that an increasing share of variable energy
sources in the power market and the liberalization of the energy markets is driving
a need for increased transmission expansion. Brunekreeft et al. (2005) gives an
overview of the current debate on electricity transmission by organizing a large set
of questions in four overcharging issues which we will discuss below.
The first is the question of whether locational marginal pricing (LMP), also called
nodal pricing, provide efficient long term investment signals to generators and
consumers. Grid charges should ideally encourage efficient short-run investments
and use of the network, efficient signals to guide generation investment decisions
and at the same time be fair, politically feasible and encourage cost recovery. Thus
2Although the price per kWh usually is higher in a small generation unit than a large one, the
economies of scale is usually not considered to be significant enough to preclude competition.
9setting these charges at the right level is quite difficult, but nevertheless critical for
efficient use and development of the grid.
If LMP does not provide adequate market signals, additional differences in grid
charges will be required. We differ between deep and shallow connection charges.
The latter refers to a situation where power producers only pays the cost of con-
necting their plant to the nearest grid, whereas the system operator pays for any
necessary reinforcements in the grid. This minimizes the costs for the power pro-
ducers and gives incentive to choose locations based on resource availability instead
of on grid availability. With deep connection charges the power producers are re-
sponsible for paying both connection and reinforcement costs. This increases the
costs for the power producers and gives incentive to locate production based on
grid availability. Shallow connection charges are usually preferred, but deep con-
nection charging can become necessary if LMP does not cover fixed network costs
sufficiently.
Second comes the question of whether market coupling will work in Europe. Pre-
viously cross border trading was done mainly to ensure reliability and security of
supply in times of power shortages. Nowadays the transmission capacity is used for
trade. Initially this trade was organized locally and only between interconnected
countries. They traded transmission capacity and electricity separately. Trans-
mission capacity was explicitly auctioned and electricity was traded in a separate
market place. The idea of market coupling is that this trade can be done more
efficiently on a pan European level if power exchanges and TSOs work together to
couple the trade of electricity and transmission capacity through so called implicit
auctioning. This follows naturally from the general liberalization of energy markets
and the perception that market based mechanisms are required.
When trade is coupled the individual TSOs determine the amount of transmission
capacity available for trade and announce this. Power exchanges matches demand
and supply for electricity and a joint market coupling system determines the price
and the amount of electricity to be imported or exported. This has been done in
Scandinavia since 1993. In 2006 France, Belgium and the Netherlands coupled their
markets followed by Germany and Denmark in 2009. In 2010 all these countries,
including some Baltic states coupled their markets. Better pan European market
coupling is intended to provide greater security of supply, better utilization of
transmission capacity, more stable electricity prices.
An alternative to market coupling as a means of handling cross border congestion
favored by some parties, is a move towards more refined coordinated auctions.
The third issue is merchant investments. Some interconnectors are highly prof-
itable. For example the NordNed HVDC cable between Norway and the Nether-
lands earned 100 millions e of revenues during its first year of operation in 2008
(Doorman and Frøystad, 2013). Investment costs of new capacity have traditionally
been paid nationally by the countries making the investment. Costs of cross-border
lines have been shared bilaterally. With this cost allocation, some countries may
end up paying for other countries’ benefit. Since each country decides his own
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investments all cooperation needs to be incentive compatible and rational. Mer-
chant investments mitigates the need for voluntary agreements between the TSOs
on either side of the interonnectors, but raises new regulatory issues.
The fourth and final issue is the need to better understand how to design incentive
mechanisms for TSOs. It is important to find mechanisms which do not incentivice
TSOs to increase costs rather than decrease them. Brunekreeft et al. (2005) calls
the understanding of this issue underdeveloped.
2.2 Energy Infrastructure in the European Union
Energy infrastructure is key to all our energy goals: from security of
supply, the integration of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency
to the proper functioning of the internal market. It is therefore essential
that we pull together our resources and accelerate the realization of EU
priority projects. - EU Comissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger 3
The European Union internal market seeks to guarantee the free movement of the
EU "four freedoms," goods, capital, services and people within the EU member
states. For this market to work for electricity, an efficient and robust energy in-
frastructure is required. The goal is to balance demand and supply across borders
rather than focusing on national markets.
Furthermore European energy infrastructure is in need of upgrades to be suited
to match future demand for energy, provide adequate security of supply and to
support the integration of renewable energy in the energy mix.
Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the European energy infrastructure priorities. Im-
provements in the North Seas Offshore grid are needed to include production ca-
pacity in the northern seas and the Scandinavian peninsula in the European power
market. Improved interconnections in the South Western and Central and South
Eastern parts of Europe are needed to assist the integration of these markets in
the European internal market and for the integration of renewable energy in the
energy mix. The Baltic Energy Market Integration Plan (BEMIP) comprises both
gas and electricity and is a plan for better integration of the Baltic countries to
wider EU energy networks.
3http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1512_en.htm?locale=en
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Figure 2.3: European energy infrastructure priorities for electricity
The investments for the following decade are included in the European Ten Year
Network Development Plan (Entsoe, 2014c). Some Projects of Common Interest
(PCI) have been recognized by the European Commission (European Comission,
2014). These projects provide significant benefit for at least two member states and
will benefit from faster granting procedures as well as access to additional financial
support. The EU has also introduced the Inter TSO compensation mechanism
(European Comission, 2010a) which is intended to compensate TSOs for hosting
transit flows.
2.3 Game Theory
This section aims to introduce some important concepts for this thesis and is by
no means meant to provide an exhaustive overview of the field of game theory.
Game theory strives to formalize the theory and mathematics describing strategic
interactions between agents. A game in this context consists of the following three
elements: A set of players, a set of actions or strategies and a set of pay-off or utility
functions for each player. Game theory differs from conventional economic theory
in the sense that players anticipate the reactions of other players and consequences
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of their own choice. A player’s pay-off depends on its own actions and the choices
made by other players. Furthermore it is assumed that all players are rational in an
economic sense. A player will never intentionally choose to make a choice leaving
her worse off. At the same time the player knows that all other players also are
rational.
Game theory makes more sense with few players. It is hard to believe that a single
player will take into account the actions of an infinite amount of other players. This
is often handled by considering just a few players and then allocating the rest of
the market to a competitive fringe which is assumed to act as perfect competition.
Modern day game theory is based on the classical work by Cournot (1838) and von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The economist John Nash wrote the famous
Nash papers (Nash, 1950, 1951) and the notion of Nash equilibrium has become
important in analyzing a wide range of situations, spanning from politics to biology
and artificial intelligence. In a Nash equilibrium it is assumed that the players can
impact the other players pay-off by their choice of strategy, but given the other
players choice of strategy, no player has an incentive to change their own choice of
strategy. If a Nash equilibrium exists, this is a stable solution to a game.
To find equilibrium solutions one look for dominant strategies. Say we have a
set of players i ∈ I. These players have a set of pure strategies, xi ∈ Xi. Pure
strategy simply means the player chooses one of the strategies with probability 1. A
player plays mixed strategies if he chooses strategies with a probability distribution.
The utility of player i is given by its utility function ui (xi). A strategy is strictly
dominant if ui (xi, x−i) > ui(x′i, x−i), where xi and x′i ∈ Xi and x−i ∈ X−i denotes
the set of strategies with the i’th element removed. A weakly dominant strategy
exists if ui (xi, x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, x−i) and ui (xi, x−i) > ui(x′i, x−i) for at least one
xi ∈ Xi (Jackson, 2011).
An extension to the Nash equilibrium is the Generalized Nash Equilibrium, first
formally introduced by Debreu (1952) and further developed in Arrow and Debreu
(1954). In the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) the players can
impact both the other players pay-off and their set of feasible strategies. GENEPs
arise quite naturally from Nash equilibrium problems (NEP) when players share
a common resource or have some joint constraints (Facchinei and Kanzow, 2007).
For example transmission networks with capacity restrictions. GNEPs are usually
very difficult to solve due to lack of uniqueness in the solutions.
We differentiate between cooperative and non cooperative games. In cooperative
games players form groups engaging in cooperative behavior and the resulting game
is between coalitions of players rather than between individual players.
We also differentiate between constant sum games and non-constant sum games.
In constant sum games the sum of the profits for the individual players is constant,
but the distribution of profits can vary. In non-constant games the sum of payoff
depend on the strategies chosen. Such games can encourage cooperative behavior
if the players know the sum of payoffs. In other words the size of the pie, can be
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changed.
One famous example of a non-constant, non-cooperative game is the prisoners
dilemma. This is a game where two players can choose between two strategies; A
and B. The sum of payoffs is highest if both players choose strategy A, but each
individual player will have a higher payoff if he chooses strategy B. Thus the stable
outcome is for both players to choose strategy B and thus making both worse off.
Another important concept is the Stackelberg game which is a sequential game.
This game formulation works well for modeling games with sequential moves or
leader follower relationships. It is a bi-level game. One standard solution method
is backward induction where first the leader’s decisions are fixed, then the follower’s
reaction function are found using their first order optimality condition. A reaction
function describe a players best response given another players move. This is
used to derive the optimization problem for the leader which is constrained by the
response of the followers.
When the lower level problem’s first order optimality conditions are inserted into
the upper level problem as constraints, the decision variables for the lower level
problems, mathematically speaking, becomes decision variables of the upper level
problem. This is not a problem when the lower level response is unique for all
upper level decisions. However if the lower level is indifferent between a set of
responses, given the upper level’s decision, this approach implicitly assumes the
lower level will choose to do what is best for the upper level. This is thus an
optimistic approach to modeling bi-level games. In pessimistic bi level games the
lower level will choose the response yielding the worst outcome for the upper level.
Such a situation could occur if the upper and lower level players are rivals.
2.4 Mathematical Modeling of Power Markets
There are several different approaches to mathematical modeling of energy mar-
kets. Many are based on optimization theory, equilibrium theory or both. Ventosa
et al. (2005) identify three major modeling trends in electricity market model-
ing; optimization, equilibrium and simulation models. Subsection 2.4.1 gives an
introduction to optimization, and Subsection 2.4.2 summarizes some equilibrium
modeling approaches. In general an optimization model finds the optimal decision
for one firm, whereas equilibrium models search for a market equilibrium where no
player has an incentive to change her decision given the other players decisions. The
equilibrium solution is not necessarily a globally optimal solution. Consequently
searching for an optimal solution is usually harder when faced with an equilibrium
problem than an optimization model.
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2.4.1 Optimization
The field of optimization belongs to the field of applied mathematics and seeks to
facilitate optimal decisions using mathematical methods and models. The opti-
mal decisions will usually be the decisions maximizing or minimizing an objective
function of its arguments subject to a set of constraints. The general set-up is:
max
x
f(x) (2.1a)
s.t. gi(x) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.1b)
x ∈ X (2.1c)
Where x denotes the decision variables belonging to the set X, f(x) denotes the
objective function and gi(x) the i′th constraint. The complexity of the objective
function (2.1a) and the constraints (2.1b) and (2.1c) vary, and defines different
classes of optimization problems. If all functions (f, gi) are linear and all variables
are continuous (x ∈ Rn) we call the optimization problem a linear programming
problem (LP). (Lundgren et al., 2010) Every LP problem has an associated dual
problem which is defined by the same input data as the primal problem. The
following linear program:
min
x
cTx (2.2a)
s.t. Ax ≥ b (2.2b)
x ≥ 0 (2.2c)
has the corresponding dual:
max
y
bT y (2.3a)
s.t. AT y ≤ c (2.3b)
y ≥ 0 (2.3c)
The Weak Duality theorem for LP’s states that the primal and dual objective
function values are bounded on each other for a pair of feasible vectors, x, y, such
that cTx ≥ bT y. The Strong Duality theorem states that if x and y are feasible
and cTx = bT y we have found the optimal solution. (Lundgren et al., 2010)
In some sense these primal and dual aspects can be considered an equilibrium
problem where the two problems represent different players controlling different
variables. In this case one player controls x and the other player controls y. In
optimum there is a balance between the competing players objective function val-
ues. This concept extends to nonlinear programs as well if the objective function
is convex in a minimization problem, or concave in a maximization problem, and
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the constraints meet certain constraint qualifications. If the objective function and
the feasible region defined by the constraints are convex, the problem is convex.
When this is the case each local optimum will also be a global optimum. Thus one
constraint qualification is to have a convex feasible region. However this does not
always hold. Other constraint qualifications are for instance the Abadie and the
Guignard constraint qualifications. See for instance Flegel and Kanzow (2004) for
a discussion of these.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) Conditions are necessary and sufficient op-
timality conditions in mathematical programming, given certain problem require-
ments. They describe the characteristics of the optimal solution and can support
the development of solution algorithms to nonlinear programs (Lundgren et al.,
2010).
Consider the following general maximization problem:
max
x
f(x) (2.4a)
s.t. gi(x) ≤ bi (λi) , ∀i ∈ I (2.4b)
hj(x) = 0 (γj) , ∀j ∈ J (2.4c)
x ≥ 0 (2.4d)
where λi and γj represents the Lagrangian multipliers for the constraints. Every
restriction has an associated multiplier, and the multiplier expresses how much
the objective function value will change if the right hand side of the restriction is
increased by one unit. If the objective function (2.4a) is concave and the feasible
region described by (2.4b) - (2.4d) is convex, the KKT conditions are necessary
and sufficient conditions for optimality. The KKT conditions for the minimization
problem in 2.4 are expressed below in Equations 2.5.
∇f(x) +
∑
i
λi∇gi(x)T +
∑
j
γj∇hj(x)T = 0 (2.5a)
λi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.5b)
gi(x) ≤ bi ∀i ∈ I (2.5c)
hi(x) = 0, γj , free ∀j ∈ J (2.5d)
λi (bi − gi(x)) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.5e)
The first set of equations (2.5a)-(2.5e) ensures dual feasibility as ∇f(x) is stated
as a non-negative linear combination of the constraint gradients. (2.5c) and (2.5d)
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ensures primal feasibility. The solution has to be feasible to be optimal. The final
constraint (2.5e) defines complementarity and states which set of constraints that
are active in the solution x.
We have seen that optimization can be used to find the best decisions to max-
imize or minimize an objective function. Further we have seen that the primal
and dual aspects of optimization have relations to equilibrium and that the KKT
conditions are necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for convex problems.
Consequently optimization models can successfully be used to model energy mar-
kets. However this approach requires the players objective to be consistent with
one overall objective. This assumption is not valid in the presence of market power,
as the perfect competition approach no longer can be used (Gabriel et al., 2012).
This leads us to complementarity modeling.
2.4.2 Equilibrium Modeling
Equilibrium modeling aims at finding the equilibrium state. A form of the equi-
librium state can be different competition equilibriums such as the Nash-Cournot
Equilibrium. By the help of equilibrium models, one may be able to predict how
the system will look like in the future or how it will respond when introduced to
changes.
Equilibrium problems can be modeled using complementarity problems. When
doing this the dual as well as the primal variables are used. Figure 2.4 gives an
overview of various classes of complementarity problems. Both linear programs
(LP) and quadratic programs (QP) are convex, thus the KKT conditions are nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for optimality for these problems. Non-linear pro-
grams (NLP) are not necessarily convex, but if they are, the KKT conditions are
necessary and sufficient conditions for these as well. Other non-optimization based
problems like spatial price equilibria, traffic equilibria and Nash-Cournot games
are also examples of complementary problems. Mixed complementarity problems
(MCP) is an umbrella term for the mentioned problem classes. Figure 2.4 summa-
rizes this.
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Figure 2.4: An overview of complementarity problems (Gabriel, 2013)
Mixed Complementarity Problems
The idea of equilibrium modeling is to solve several optimization programs simul-
taneously to find an equilibrium where all agents are happy. In complementarity
models we are able to involve both the primal variables (e.g. production levels)
and dual variables (e.g. market prices) in the model formulation. Traditional
optimization models do not handle this mixing of variables (Gabriel et al., 2012).
Gabriel et al. (2012) states the most common representation of a mixed comple-
mentarity problem (MCP) as follows: Having a function F : Rn → Rn, MCP(F )
is to find vectors x ∈ Rn1 , y ∈ Rn2 such that for all i:
1. Fi(x, y) ≥ 0, xi · Fi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., n1
2. Fj+n1(x, y) = 0, yj free, j = 1, ..., n2
Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
An extension to MCPs are bi-level problems. Bi-level models are characterized by a
hierarchical relationship between two autonomous decision makers. Two problems
are included in one instance and one of the problems are part of the constraints
of the other. An overview of bi-level optimization is given in Colson et al. (2007).
When an optimization problem is constrained by an equilibrium problem it is
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often referred to as aMathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC).
Gabriel et al. (2012) gives the following general representation of MPECs:
max f(x, y) (2.6)
s.t. x, y ∈ Ω (2.7)
y ∈ S(x) (2.8)
In the example above x represents some upper-level decisions (e.g. production level)
for a dominant player and y represents some lower-level decisions. The lower-level
decisions (e.g. the market) arise from an equilibrium problem. Thus the upper-level
player’s decisions are constrained by the lower-level equilibrium problem. MPECs
are useful for modeling leader-follower equilibria a la von Stackelberg (1952). Chen
et al. (2004) formulate a large scale MPEC to analyze a Stackelberg game where
the largest producer in an electricity market has the ability to manipulate both
the electricity and emissions market to its advantage. Gabriel and Leuthold (2010)
use an MPEC formulation to solve a Stackelberg game for a network-constrained
energy market.
2.4.3 Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints
An equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints, EPEC, is a program where
several MPEC’s are to be solved. This is typically used when one wish to model
markets where there is more than one leader and we need to model multiple leader-
common follower games.
Common solution procedures for EPECs are enumeration and diagonalization.
Enumeration simply finds all possible solutions whereas diagonalization is a version
of the Gauss-Seidel algorithm and solves each MPEC consecutively (Gabriel et al.,
2012).
2.4.4 Solving Mathematical Problems with Equilibrium Con-
straints
The problem with MPECs is that they are in general non-convex and non-differentiable.
Thus they violate most standard constraint qualifications and standard algorithms
cannot find a guaranteed optimal solution, even if the objective function is strongly
convex. Also, any smooth reformulation of the complementarity constraints vi-
olates the Mangasarian- Fromovitz constraint qualification, which is crucial for
stability (Chen et al., 2004). Nevertheless several decomposition and relaxation
approaches have been developed in order to solve MPECs.
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One common solution approach is to linearize the lower level KKT conditions using
disjunctive constraints. This is done in Gabriel and Leuthold (2010). However dis-
junctive constraints are computationally expensive. Furthermore the approach re-
quires the modeler to select appropriate values for constants used in the constraints,
which can be challenging. Siddiqui and Gabriel (2012) therefore use Schur’s de-
composition and SOS1 type variables to linearize the constraints in the lower-level
problem, and show that this method computationally outperforms other methods.
Disjunctive Constraints Approach
The disjunctive constraints approach, introduced by Fortuny-Amat and McCarl
(1981), replaces equilibrium constraints by integer restrictions in the form of dis-
junctive constraints. This transforms the MPEC into a mixed integer linear pro-
gram (MILP) or a mixed integer non-linear program (MINLP), which is easier to
solve than an MPEC. MILP problems are fairly straight forward to solve, provided
the number of integer variables is not too large.
Given an MPEC where the lower level problem is a complementary problem:
minf(x, y) (2.9a)
s.t.(x, y) ∈ ω (2.9b)
y ≥ 0 (2.9c)
g(x, y) ≥ 0 (2.9d)
yT g(x, y) ≥ 0 (2.9e)
The complementarity conditions can be replaced by disjunctive constraints by in-
troducing a vector of binary variables r and parameters K.
This would give the following reformulation:
minf(x, y) (2.10a)
s.t.(x, y) ∈ ω (2.10b)
0 ≤ y ≤ K(1− r) (2.10c)
0 ≤ g(x, y) ≤ Kr (2.10d)
As illustrated by equation 2.10c and 2.10d, the disjunctive constraints approach
transforms an MPEC into an MINLP or MILP depending on the objective of
the MPEC. There are two important drawbacks with this approach. Firstly, it
is computationally expensive for large models. Although there has been great
progress in the development of good MILP and MINLP solution methods and the
implementation of these in solvers, such as CLPEX and Dicopt, it is still challenging
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to solve large integer programs. Second, the disjunctive constraints approach is very
sensitive towards the selection of the K-parameters. These are problem specific and
has to be neither too big nor too small, as this can cause computational difficulties.
Too small K’s result in a too tight formulation, and cause errors in the problem
formulation. Too large K’s cause the conditioning number to increase. Thus this
can cause numerical errors (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012). Badly chosen K’s can
cause the solution value to differ greatly from the true answer.
SOS1-Based Appraoch
An alternative method for solving MPECs is the SOS1-Based Approach presented
by Siddiqui and Gabriel (2012). They use Schur’s decomposition to replace the
complementarity conditions. The absolute value term introduced by Schur’s de-
composition is reformulated using SOS-1 variables.
Say we want to linearize the following complementary condition:
0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0 (2.11)
First the condition can be reformulated using the variables u and v by Schur’s
decomposition.
x ≥ 0 (2.12a)
y ≥ 0 (2.12b)
u− |v| = 0 (2.12c)
u = x+ y2 (2.12d)
v = x− y2 (2.12e)
Second v can be reformulated using SOS-1 variables by decomposing it into its
positive and negative parts: v = v+ − v−, where v+ and v− are SOS-1 variables.
This way an exact, linear formulation of 2.11 is:
x ≤ 0 (2.13a)
y ≤ 0 (2.13b)
u− (v+ + v−) = 0 (2.13c)
u = x+ y2 (2.13d)
v+ − v− = x+−y2 (2.13e)
v+, v−are SOS-1 variables (2.13f)
Siddiqui and Gabriel (2012) report good computational results using this method.
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Solving MPECs as Non-linear Problems
Some research (Fletcher et al., 2002; Fletcher and Leyffer, 2004; Leyffer, 2006)
also indicate that MPECs can be solved as non-linear programs, using sequen-
tial quadratic programming (SQP). Fletcher et al. (2002) present a convergence
analysis showing that SQP methods converge quadratically when applied to the
NLP equivalent of an MPEC. The NLP is obtained by expressing complementary
constraints of the form:
0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0 (2.14)
as
x ≥ 0 (2.15a)
y ≥ 0 (2.15b)
xT · y ≤ 0 (2.15c)
This research indicate that the sequential quadratic programming approach can
compute stationary points to MPECs when using a smooth reformulation of the
complementary constraints.
Heuristics
Heuristic methods like generic algorithms, simulated annealing and tabu search
are more flexible with respect to problem formulation and mathematical proper-
ties, like convexity. Good feasible solutions can be found, but heuristic methods
cannot guarantee an optimal solution. Latorre et al. (2003) classify publications
and models on transmission expansion planning and list several heuristic models.
Bjus and Belmans (2012) use a generic algorithm to solve an MPEC representing
a transmission planning problem.
2.5 Global Optimization
The field of applied mathematics that studies extremal locations of non-
convex functions subject to (possibly) non convex constraints is called
Global Optimization.
(Liberti, 2008) (page 3)
Simplified, global optimization seeks global solutions of a constrained optimiza-
tion model. Nonlinear models occur in many fields; e.g. in chemical engineering,
data analysis, biotechnology and mathematical problems. The challenge with non
convex optimization is that in the absence of convexity, the standard constraint
qualifications do not hold. This means that a point satisfying the KKT-conditions
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can be a global minimum, local minimum, a saddle point, or even a local or global
maximum. This makes finding the globally optimal solution challenging.
In recent years, there have been developed algorithms that try to tackle nonconvex
problems. Exact methods for solving non convex problems include enumeration
strategies, successive approximation, Bayesian and adaptive stochastic search algo-
rithms. Heuristic strategies include globalized extensions of local search methods,
evolution strategies, simulated annealing and tabu search (János Pintér ).
Many of these methods are unfortunately computationally expensive. Some of the
most successful algorithms for solving deterministic global optimization problems
have been based on Branch-and-Select techniques. One of the first methods to deal
directly with the generic non convex NLPs was Ryoo and Sahinidis’ Branch-and-
Reduce algorithm published in 1995 (Tawarmalani and Sahinidis, 2005). Sahinidis
has used his work in this field to develop BARON, a global solver (Sahinidis, 2013).
If the nonlinear problem contain integer variables, we get a Mixed-Integer Non-
linear Problem (MINLP). This problem often occur in transmission planning and
economic welfare models. Algorithms for globally solving MINLPs can be divided
into two categories; deterministic and stochastic. Common for both types of al-
gorithms are two algorithm phases; the global and the local phase. The global
phase explore the search space. Regions that are known not to contain the global
optimal solution are not explored. If there is a possibility that the region contain
the optimal solution, the local phase is initiated. A local optimization procedure
is called to identify locally optimal points. The search for solutions stop when it
can be proved that no part of the feasible region can contain a better solution than
the one already found. A mathematical description of a basic Branch-and-Select
algorithm can be found in Liberti (2008)
Chapter 3
Literature
This chapter gives an overview of literature on transmission expansion planning in
Section 3.1,and the role of transmission capacity extensions in supporting renewable
energy in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 introduces some literature on transmission ex-
pansion modeling. The chapter concludes with some literature on national strategic
investments in transmission infrastructure in Section 3.4.
3.1 Transmission Expansion Planning
The need for better coordination of investments on a European level is pointed
out by among others Meeus et al. (2006) and Buijs et al. (2010). The latter dis-
cuss seams issues, i.e. trade across boundaries with other TSOs, in European
transmission investments. The need for investments will require voluntary cooper-
ation between countries. However supranational thinking is unlikely in the current
framework. In order to go beyond the current suboptimal situation, national and
European goals need to be better aligned. The same issue is discussed for the US
by Benjamin (2007).
Brunekreeft et al. (2005) stress that electricity transmission is critical for success-
fully liberalizing power markets and for being able to extend the European Single
market to electricity, and point out better incentives for TSOs, especially with
respect to cross-border issues, as a key issue for further research.
3.2 Interconnectors and Renewable Energy
As was discussed in Subsection 2.1.2 increasing shares of variable energy sources
in the energy mix are difficult to handle in the power system because stochastic
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supply has to balance with demand. Interconnectors will have an important role
in supporting renewable energy.
Schaber et al. (2012a) use a regional power system model to examine the effect on
the power market from increasing shares of variable energy sources in the European
power system. They find that grid extensions are economically very advantageous
for both base load and variable renewable energy utility owners, and show that
transmission extensions reduce the market effect of large quantities of renewable
energy. In a following paper Schaber et al. (2012b) find that grid extensions can
reduce the need for expensive backup generation and electricity storage.
Scorah et al. (2012) study the interaction of a hydro power dominated power system
(British Colombia) and a thermal dominated system with increasing shares of wind
power (Alberta). They find that better integration between the markets mutually
benefit the two systems. On the one hand the thermal system support the hydro
system during drought and on the other hand the hydro reservoirs serve as storage
for the wind power.
Fürsch et al. (2013) iterate an investment and dispatch optimization model with
a load flow based grid model to quantify the benefits of optimal transmission grid
extensions in Europe until 2050. They find that deployment of renewable energy
in favorable sites is cost effective, even when including the costs for transmission
grid extensions.
3.3 Transmission Expansion Modeling
The network expansion problem is in nature a complex multi-period, multi-objective
problem, and is consequently difficult to solve. Latorre et al. (2003) gives an excel-
lent overview of various publications and models on transmission expansion plan-
ning. They classify publications by solution methods, the treatment of the planning
horizon and the consideration of the new competitive schemes in the power sector.
The solution methods are mainly mathematical optimization methods or heuristic
methods.
As was discussed in Section 2.1.1, physical exchange of electricity impact the whole
system. Commercial trading on the other hand is bilateral. Schweppe et al. (1988)
represent one of the first attempts to integrate load flow in transmission expansion
modeling. Since the DC load flow approach have become quite common in power
transmission modeling.
Garcés et al. (2009) use a bilevel approach to transmission expansion planning
where the upper level represent the TSO and the lower level represent a number
of market clearing scenarios. The objective of the upper and lower level is social
welfare maximization. They utilize the aligning objectives to reduce the problem
to a single level problem and recast this as a mixed integer linear program which
they test on a 24-bus system.
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Suma and Oren (2007) look at transmission expansion planning with different ob-
jectives in order to consider different economic criteria for planning. The different
objectives cause divergent optimal solutions. From this the authors conclude that
finding a unique politically feasible and fundable solution can be very difficult,
verging on impossible.
3.4 National Strategic Investments
The distributed benefits in a meshed grid, and the fact that transmission planning
is mainly done on a national level has motivated research on the effect of strate-
gic investments by national planners. This is different from studies treating the
generators as strategic players (Neuhoff et al., 2005; Pozo et al., 2013; Sauma and
Oren, 2006). National strategic players maximize the overall social welfare of an
area, whereas generators acting as strategic players maximize the strategic gener-
ators’ profit. Pozo et al. (2013) and Sauma and Oren (2006) study the generation
investment response following transmission investments.
Egerer et al. (2013a) does an applied study, attempting to determine an optimal
expansion plan for the European electricity grid to support the decarbonization
of the electricity sector until 2050. The objective in this model is pan-European
minimization of total system costs. However, as discussed previously, the benefits
from transmission investments are likely to accrue to more areas than the ones
bearing the costs. Thus optimal expansion plans are not likely to be implemented
without some form of compensation mechanisms.
Nylund and Egerer (2013) use a non-cooperative game theoretic approach to com-
pare bilateral cost sharing to regional cost sharing based on the proportional benefit
from the investments. They use enumeration to develop a pay-off matrix. From
studying this they find that the regional cost sharing solutions come closer to the
system welfare optimal solutions than the bilateral cost sharing solutions. One
problem with such a regional cost sharing approach is to decide on a reference
point to measure the relative benefit for an area.
Two models similar to the models presented in this thesis are Bjus and Belmans
(2012) and Huppmann and Egerer (2014). Bjus and Belmans (2012) compare a
supranational planner to a situation where zonal planners maximize the sum of
net consumer surplus, generation profit and congestion revenues less investment
costs in his zone. Finally they implement a Pareto-planner which ensures that the
zonal welfare does not decrease below the initial situation for any node. The zonal
planner and Pareto-planner problem are modeled as MPECs. The MPEC for each
node are combined to an EPEC representing the equilibrium between all planners.
Bjus and Belmans (2012) use a generic algorithm to solve the MPECs, but they
do not actually compute the solution to the EPEC representing the equilibrium
between all planners.
Huppmann and Egerer (2014) present a three level equilibrium model with a supra-
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national planner deciding on cross border investments on the upper level, zonal
planners on the intermediate level and the spot market on the lower level. The
zonal planners only decide on investments within their area. Cross border lines
are decided by the supranational planner on the upper level. They use an iterative
solution algorithm to identify multiple equilibria in the national strategic game
between zonal planners. There may be several feasible solutions to the problem,
but not all will be Nash equilibriums in the sense that a zone can have a positive
deviation from the feasible solution with a different choice of strategy.
Our main contribution compared to the models above is the treatment of the
planning horizon. We take a long term perspective by the inclusion of time periods.
Furthermore we implement both a situation where the planning node incurs all costs
associated with investments and a bilateral cost sharing situation. We also show
that our MPEC can be solved to optimality for small instances.
Chapter 4
Model Formulation for the
Supranational Planner
The transmission planning problem examined in this thesis has a bi-level structure.
A transmission planner maximizes social welfare subject to investment constraints
on the upper level, and the market outcome is decided in the lower level problem.
The upper level planner’s objective can be to maximize the welfare of all nodes
(e.g. countries) in the market, a selection of nodes or a single node. This chapter
presents a model for a planner maximizing the social welfare of all nodes. We call
this the supranational planner as it maximizes the welfare on a supranational level.
The purpose of this model is to represent a pan European investment perspective.
The problem structure is illustrated in Figure 4.1. This is the structure of a Stackel-
berg game, where the leader decides on transmission investments while anticipating
the market outcome. The market constitutes the Stackelberg follower and decides
on generation output, sales, flow and nodal prices. This Stackelberg game can be
modeled as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). When
there is only one planner for all nodes, the bi-level problem can be reduced to a
single level problem. This can be done because the objective function of the up-
per level problem and the lower level problems align, as explained in Garcés et al.
(2009). The new problem structure is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Bi-level problem structure
Figure 4.2: Single-level problem structure
The single level optimization problem illustrated in Figure 4.2 is much easier to
solve than the bi-level MPEC illustrated in Figure 4.1. In this chapter we focus on
the single level problem.
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The main assumptions are discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 explains the defi-
nitions used in the model. Section 4.3 describes the mathematical formulation for
the single level optimization model.
4.1 Main Assumptions
Each node in the model represents a country. The nodes are connected by a set of
arcs which represent power transmission lines.
The energy sources are described by their generation capacity, generation cost and
capacity factor. The capacity factors are used to adjust for the seasonal availability
of variable renewable energy sources, e.g. wind and solar. We do not consider
uncertainty in the supply. Due to the aggregation level of the model we ignore non-
convexities like minimum output levels, ramping constraints and start-up costs. We
assume linear generation costs.
Demand is described by linear inverse demand curves. There are producers and
consumers present in every node. All generator types are present in each node, but
with different generation capacities.
The generators can sell the power they produce in their own node or to other nodes
as long as there is sufficient transmission capacity on the transmission lines. The
electricity prices result from market clearing in every node. We assume perfect
competition in the electricity market. The focus in this thesis is not on the compe-
tition between the generators in the power market, but on the strategic investments
in transmission capacity.
The transmission planner invests in transmission capacity. We assume that the
transmission planner has full knowledge of the generation portfolio, its cost struc-
ture and location, as well as the demand functions in every node. The cost for
transmission expansion is assumed to be a cost per unit of effect. This cost is
covered by the node deciding to do the investment.
The flow of electricity in the network is modeled under the assumption of pure
transportation. Each arc has an upper transmission limit. A more realistic model-
ing option to electricity markets is the DC load flow approach. However, given the
high aggregation level of the model the pure transportation method was chosen.
The time periods can represent either a season or a year. Two seasons constitute
a year.
4.2 Definitions
In both the optimization and MCP model, all indices and variables are written with
small letters. Sets and parameters are written in capital letters. Dual variables are
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written in small Greek letters.
Sets and indices:
n,m ∈ N Nodes
t ∈ T Seasons
f ∈ F Fuels
Parameters and functions:
CGENn,f,t Marginal production cost of fuel f in node n and season t
CAPGENn,f,t Maximum production capacity of fuel f in node n in season t
AVn,f,t Capacity factor of fuel f in node n in season t
CAPTn,m,t Transmission capacity from node n to node m in season t
CINVn,m Investment cost on connection between node n and m in season t
An,t Demand intercept in node n in season t
Bn,t Demand slope in node n season t
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Variables:
w Social welfare of market
dn,t Demand in node n in season t
qprodn,f,t Quantity generated by power generator of type f in node n in
season t
qsoldn,m,t Quantity sold by power generators in node n to node m in season
t
xn,m Amount invested on line from node n to node m
flown,m,t Flow from node n to node m in season t
γn,f,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with generation capacity in of
fuel f in node n in season t
φn,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with generation equals to sold
constraint in node n in season t
ptn,m,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with flow on line between node
n to node m in season t
n,m,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with flow capacity on line be-
tween node n to m in season t
µn,m,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with investment constraint on
connection from n to m in season t
peln,t Price of electricity in node n in season t
4.3 Mathematical Model for the Supranational Plan-
ner
The model presented in this section maximize social welfare for an energy market
subject to production and transmission constraints.
max w =
∑
n,t
(An,t · dn,t − 0.5 ·Bn,t · d2n,t)−
∑
n,f,t
CGENn,f,t · qprodn,f,t (4.1)
−
∑
n,m
(
CINVn,m · xn,m
)
s.t
qprodn,f,t ≤ CAPGENn,f,t ·AVn,f,t ∀ n, f, t (γn,f,t) (4.2)
∑
f
qprodn,f,t =
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t ∀ n, t (φn,t) (4.3)
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flown,m,t = qsoldn,m,t ∀ n,m, t (ptn,m,t) (4.4)
flown,m,t+flowm,n,t−CAPTn,m,t−xn,m,t−xm,n,t ≤ 0 ∀ n,m, t (n,m) (4.5)
dn,t =
∑
m
qSOLDn,m,t ∀ n, t (peln,t) (4.6)
Equation 4.1 maximizes social welfare. Social welfare is calculated as the sum
of consumer and producer surplus minus investment costs. Consumer surplus is
calculated as the difference between the maximum price a consumer is willing to
pay and the amount it actually pays. Producer surplus is calculated as the income
from sales minus production costs. Equations 4.2 set the maximum generation
capacity per time period. The parameter AVn,f,t accounts for variations in available
generation capacity for wind and solar-based technologies. Balance between the
amount of electricity generated and sold is ensured by equations 4.3. Equations
4.4 determine the flow of electricity on a transmission line. Equations 4.5 limits
the total flow on a line to the maximum transmission capacity plus investments
made in both directions. Investments in both directions are added to this equation
to ensure that an investment made in direction from node n to m, also increase
the transmission capacity from node m to node n. Equations 4.6 are the market
clearings.
Chapter 5
Model Formulation for the
Zonal Planner
This chapter presents the bi-level model which represents investment decisions
from a zonal planner’s perspective. The zonal planner’s objective is to maximize
the social welfare in one zone or node. The problem structure is the same as in the
previous chapter, but here the objective functions of the upper and lower level do
not align. Thus the bi-level problem cannot be reduced to a single level problem,
and we have to solve a mathematical problem constrained by an optimization
problem. The main assumptions are the same as in the previous chapter, but
the upper level planner now has the objective of maximizing the social welfare in
his node. The upper level planner decides on investments in transmission capacity
on lines connected to his node.
The assumptions for this model is given in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 explains the
mathematical notation used in the zonal planner model. The mathematical formu-
lation is given in Section 5.3. We also implement a bilateral cost sharing approach.
This is explained in Section 5.4 and the complete mathematical formulation is pre-
sented in Appendix B. Section 5.5 describe the decomposition of the models using
the disjunctive constraints approach. The complete formulations is presented in
Appendix A.
5.1 Main Assumptions
The main assumptions for the zonal planner model are the same as those in Section
4.1 in Chapter 4.
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5.2 Definitions
As in section 4.2, all indices and variables in the following mathematical formulation
are written with small letters. Sets and parameters are written in capital letters,
while dual variables are written in small Greek letters.
Sets and indices:
n,m ∈ N Nodes
n ∈ Nl Leader nodes
t ∈ T Seasons
f ∈ F Fuels
Parameters and functions:
CGENn,f,t Marginal production cost of fuel f in node n and season t
CAPGENn,f,t Maximum production capacity of fuel f in node n in season t
CAP INVn,m Maximum investment level on line from node n to m
AVn,f,t Capacity factor of fuel f in node n in season t
CAPTn,m,t Transmission capacity from node n to node m in season t
CINVn,m Investment cost on connection between node n and m in season t
An,t Demand intercept in node n in season t
Bn,t Demand slope in node n season t
K1a,K1b,K2a,K2b Constants for disjunctive constraints
K3a,K3b,K4a,K4b
K5a,K5b,K6a,K6b
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Variables:
w Social welfare of market
dn,t Demand in node n in season t
qprodn,f,t Quantity generated by power generator of type f in node n in
season t
qsoldn,m,t Quantity sold by power generators in node n to node m in season
t
xn,m Amount invested on line from node n to node m
flown,m,t Flow from node n to node m in season t
γn,f,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with generation capacity in of
fuel f in node n in season t
φn,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with generation equals sold con-
straint in node n in season t
ptn,m,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with flow on line between node
n to node m in season t
n,m,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with flow capacity on line be-
tween node n to m in season t
µn,m,t Lagrangian multiplier associated with investment constraint on
connection from n to m in season t
peln,t Price of electricity in node n in season t
Binary variables for disjunctive constraints
r1n,t,r2n,f,t,
r3n,m,t,r4n,m,t,
r5n,f,t,r6n,m,t,
r7n,m
Binary variables used to replace complementarity conditions with
disjuctive constraints
5.3 Mathematical Model for the Zonal Planner
In this model, the leading zone decides on capacity investments in order to maxi-
mize his own welfare subject the market outcome. The zonal planner cannot reduce
the capacity on any line.
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min w =
∑
n∈Nl,t
(−0.5 ·Bn,t · d2n,t) (5.1)
+
∑
n∈Nl,f,t
CGENn,f,t · qprodn,f,t −
∑
m,t
pm,t · qsoldn,m,t
−
∑
m,t
flown,m,t · ptn,m,t +
∑
n,m
CINVn,m · xn,m ∀m
s.t
0 ≤ xn,m ≤ CAP INVn,m ∀n,m ∈ N (5.2)
0 ≤ −An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≥ 0 ⊥ dn,t ≥ 0 (5.3)
0 ≤ CGENn,f,t + γn,f,t + φn,t ≥ 0 ⊥ qprodn,f,t ≥ 0 (5.4)
0 ≤ −φn,t − ptn,m,t − pelm,t ≥ 0 ⊥ qsoldn,m,t ≥ 0 (5.5)
0 ≤ n,m,t + m,n,t + ptn,m,t ≥ 0 ⊥ flown,m,t ≥ 0 (5.6)
0 ≤ −qprodn,f,t + CAPGENn,f,t ·AVn,f,t ≥ 0 ⊥ γn,f,t ≥ 0 (5.7)
∑
f
qprodn,f,t −
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t = 0 ⊥ φn,t free (5.8)
flown,m,t = qsoldn,m ⊥ ptn,m free (5.9)
0 ≤ −flown,m,t − flowm,n,t + CAPTn,m,t + xn,m + xm,n ≥ 0 ⊥ n,m,t ≥ 0
(5.10)
dn =
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t ⊥ peln free (5.11)
Equation 5.1 is the objective function of the zonal planner. It consists of the sum
of the consumer and producer surplus minus transmission and investment costs.
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The objective function is non-linear and non convex due to two bi-linear terms
including dual variables, pm,t · qsoldn,m,t and flown,m,t · ptn,m,t. Equations 5.3 - 5.11
are the KKT conditions of the lower level problem. These are found using the
procedure described in Section 2.4.1. The lower level is maximizing the welfare in
the market.
5.4 Bilateral Cost Sharing
The model described in the Section above, 5.3, assumes that all investment costs are
covered by the leader zone. An alternative is to introduce bilateral cost sharing. We
implement this by letting the nodes on either side of an upgraded line share the costs
equally. We also let the leader node invest only on the lines it is directly connected
to instead of all nodes as in the formulation above. The lower level are allowed
to invest on the other lines. We implement these changes by letting the leader
node pay half the cost of investments, adding a complementarity condition with
respect to the investment variable xn,m to the lower level and adding a constraint
specifying which lines the upper and lower level can invest on.
The leader’s new objective function becomes:
min w =
∑
n∈Nl,t
(−0.5 ·Bn,t · d2n,t) (5.12)
+
∑
n∈Nl,f,t
CGENn,f,t · qprodn,f,t −
∑
m,t
pm,t · qsoldn,m
−
∑
m,t
flown,m,t · ptn,m,t +
∑
n,m
(
0.5 · CINVn,m · xn,m
) ∀m
s.t.
0 ≤ xn,m ≤ CAP INVn,m ∀n ∈ Nl (5.13)
The additional complementarity condition with respect to the investment variable
xn,m becomes:
0 ≤ 0.5 ·CINVn,m −
∑
t
(n,m,t + m,n,t) ≥ 0 ⊥ xn,m ≥ 0 ∀ n,m 6= Nl (5.14)
In equation 5.12, we see that the leader only covers half of the investment costs. The
remaining parts of the lower level problem are not changed. The full formulation
for the zonal transmission planner problem with bilateral cost sharing is given in
Appendix B.
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5.5 Decomposition of the MPEC using Disjunc-
tive Constraints
The lower level problem can be reformulated as a mixed integer non-linear problem
(MINLP) by expressing the complementarity conditions (5.3 - 5.11) in disjunctive
form. We will illustrate this approach using the KKT-condition for demand.
0 ≤ −An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≥ 0 ⊥ dn,t ≥ 0 (5.15)
Rewritten using disjunctive constraints this complementarity condition becomes:
−An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≥ 0 (5.16)
−An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≤ K1a · r1n,t (5.17)
dn,t −K1b ·
(
1− r1n,t
) ≤ 0 (5.18)
r1n,t is a binary variable and K1a and K1b are problem specific parameters. This
approach is used on all complementarity conditions in the lower level problem.
The full mathematical formulation for the models using the disjunctive constraints
approach can be found in Appendix A.
Chapter 6
Data Set
The following chapter describes the data set we have used when running the models
described in Chapters 4 and 5. We have chosen to represent Germany, Denmark,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom with each country as
one node. We chose these countries based on the strategic connections between
them, and their generation mixes. These are also most of the countries comprised
in the North and Baltic Seas grid infrastructure project which is the number one
of "European infrastructure projects for 2020 and beyond" (European Comission,
2010b). Norway and Sweden are rich in hydro power and benefit from being con-
nected to the thermal dominated European system. Furthermore Germany and
Denmark have a large share of wind power in their generation mix, and the UK is
planning to expand their wind power production capacity. Furthermore Germany
has a significant share of solar power. The Netherlands is of strategic importance
due to the sub sea cables to Norway and the UK as well as the proximity to the
German market.
The model has a long-term perspective and we use the data set to simulate a
system state of “today” and the year 2020. The “today” situation is represented
by data for 2011 as this was the latest year we were able to obtain comprehensive
generation capacity data for. Both years are divided into two seasons, winter and
summer.
6.1 Transmission Capacity
Figure 6.1 illustrates the network represented in the model. The grey lines rep-
resent existing interconnectors with no planned upgrades, the red lines represent
interconnectors where upgrades are planned and the dashed lines represent possi-
ble future interconnectors. The existing transmission capacities are based on net
transfer capacities obtained from Entsoe (Entsoe, 2014a,b). Some interconnectors
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does not have the same transmission capacity in both directions.1 In those cases
we have used the lowest transmission capacity to represent the interconnection.
We used the Enstoe Ten Year plan for 2020 (Entsoe, 2014c) to find transmission
capacities for 2020. Table 6.1 gives an overview of new and existing transmission
capacity between the countries represented in the model. There is a possible new
line planned between Denmark and the United Kingdom, but the capacity of this
is not decided 2.
Based on a report from Thema Consulting Group (2012) we have set the price for
transmission expansion to 1.7 e/MW.
Figure 6.1: Map of cross border interconnectors in Europe
1The transmission capacity also depends on the capacity in the grid on either side of the
interconnector.
2http://www.energinet.dk/EN/El/Nyheder/Sider/Energinet-dk-og-National-Grid-
underskriver-aftale-om-Englandskabel.aspx
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Connection Current capacity Planned upgrades Project name
NO - SE 3595 1320 South West Link
NO - DK 1000 700 Skagerak 4
NO - NL 700 700 NordNed 2
NO - DE 0 1400 Nord.Link
NO - UK 0 1400 NorthConnect
SE - DK 2040 - -
SE - DE 615 - -
DK - DE 2100 500 -
DK - NL 0 700 COBRAcable
DK - UK 0 ? Possible new line
DE - NL 3850 1000- 2000 -
NL - UK 1000 1000 Nemo.Link
Table 6.1: Cross-border transmission capacities [MW] between the countries rep-
resented in the model
6.2 Generation Capacity
The generation capacities were taken from IEAs International Energy Statistics
database (The International Energy Agency (IEA), 2014). We chose to disregard
geothermal, wave, tidal and pumped storage in the dataset due to the small in-
stalled capacities. Moreover, four additional fuels would increase the number of
variables in the model. Thus we had to compromise between accuracy and com-
putational time. We used data from European Environmental Agency (EEA) to
divide the fossil fuel capacity in coal and lignite, oil and natural gas respectively.
Figure 6.2 gives an overview of the generation capacities in each country in GW.
The fuels included are natural gas oil, coal, biamass, wind, solar and hydro power.
The 2020 generation capacities are based on trends presented by European Comis-
sion (EC) (2009), Eurelectric (2011) and Eurelectric (2012), as well as Jaehnert and
Doorman (2014). Figure 6.3 gives an overview of the 2020 generation capacities in
GW. All countries increase their generation capacity, and the share of natural gas
and renewable sources increases in 2020.
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Figure 6.2: Installed generation capacity in GW in the year 2010
43
Figure 6.3: Installed generation capacity in GW in the year 2020
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The wind and solar capacities are adjusted for weather conditions with a capacity
factor. In general there is more wind in the winter and more sun in the summer.
To represent this variability we use one summer capacity factor and one winter
capacity factor for each energy source. The capacity factor for wind is based on
Sinden (2007), who did and analysis of the wind power resource of the United
Kingdom. The capacity factors for solar power were calculated based on data form
the EEX transparency platform3. We found the solar power production for the 12th
of each month for 12 succeeding months in 2012 and 2013. We let October to March
represent winter and April to September represent summer. First the average
availability for each day was calculated, assuming the total installed capacity to be
25 094 MW. Next, these days were assumed to represent the average for a month.
Consequently the winter capacity factor is the average of the capacity factors in
the winter months and the summer capacity factor is the average of the capacity
factors in the summer months. The resulting capacity factors are represented in
Table 6.2. We assume a capacity factor of 1 for the other technologies.
Summer Winter
Wind 20.0 % 38.7%
Sun 20.2 % 3.9%
Table 6.2: Capacity factors of wind and solar energy
6.3 Marginal Costs
The marginal costs for the different technologies are based on Doorman and Frøys-
tad (2013). They present marginal costs for coal and lignite separately, however
we have aggregated coal and lignite in one category as this saves one fuel and thus
decreases the number of variables in the model. Furthermore Germany is the only
country in the model with a significant share of lignite in their energy mix. We
assume 20% of the aggregated coal and lignite generation capacity to be lignite
plants and use a weighted average to calculate the marginal cost used in our data
set. Table 6.3 gives an overview of the marginal costs used in the model. We
assume the marginal production costs for wind and solar power to be zero adn the
marginal costs for hydroelectric power to be similar to the water value, which is the
value of one extra unit of water in the reservoir. As the Norwegian power system
is dominated by hydro power the electricity price will be close to the water value.
The average spot price in the NO1 area in Norway in the years 2010 to 2013 is 42
e/MWh. Based on this we use 40 e/MWh as the marginal cost for hydro power
in the data set.
3http://www.transparency.eex.com/en/
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Technology Marginal cost
Coal 36
Natural gas in UK 37.5
Natural gas other 61
Oil 150
Nuclear 9.5
Hydro 40
Wind 0
Solar 0
Biomass 29
Table 6.3: Marginal production costs [e/MWh] for various technologies
6.4 Electricity Demand
Demand is represented by linear, inverse demand curves for each country and
each season. We have used the method for calculating the inverse demand curve
described in Leuthold et al. (2012). The reference demand for each country is found
in data provided by ENTSO-E. We assume a reference price of 60 e/MWh for the
winter and 40 e/MWh for the summer. These prices are based on The Eurpean
Comission Quarterly Report on European Electricity Markets for the third and
fourth quarter in 2012 (European Comission, 2012). The electricity market is a very
inelastic market. Not all consumers observe the spot market price and thus cannot
react to it. This means that large price changes will not cause large changes in
demand. Lijesen (2007) does a study of the Netherlands and finds a price elasticity
of – 0.0014 with a linear specification and of -0.0043 using a loglinear specification.
However, several studies cited in Lijesen (2007) find higher elasticity. We have
assumed an elasticity of -0.1, which is the same as the one used in Egerer et al.
(2013b).
Based on projections from Eurelectric (2013) and Bye et al. (1995) we have assumed
an increase in demand in all countries except Germany and United Kingdom. The
estimated annual growth rate in demand is presented in Table 6.4.
Country Growth Rate
Norway 0.40 %
Sweden 0.13 %
Denmark 061 %
Germany -1.08 %
Netherlands 0.83 %
United Kingdom -0.91 %
Table 6.4: Annual growth rate in demand from 2010 until 2020.
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6.5 Data Quality
We believe our dataset is realistic and that it has a sufficient level of detail given
the high aggregation level of our model. We will however discuss some potential
weaknesses here. The transmission capacity data is good; but they could be im-
proved by including different transmission capacities in different directions where
this occurs. The generation capacities are based on data from IEA, and we assume
these to be accurate. However we have used data from 2005 to divide the fossil fuel
generation capacity into shares of coal, oil and natural gas for each country. We
have reason to believe that these shares have changed somewhat since 2005, but
this was the latest data obtainable. On the one hand we could assume the share of
coal and oil to have decreased due to the high carbon emissions from these sources.
Furthermore the price of oil is very high compared to coal and gas and there is an
overall trend towards decreasing share of oil in the energy mix. On the other hand,
the price of coal is low compared to natural gas resulting in an increasing share of
coal.
The 2020 generation capacities are only projections. The capacities are not meant
to represent a “most likely” scenario for European power generation capacities in
2020, but rather a future with large amounts of wind and solar power in the energy
mix to see how more variable generation capacity affects the need for transmission
capacity.
The calculation of the solar power capacity factors is based on 12 different days.
Nothing indicates that any of these days are outliers. The resulting capacity factors
are along the lines of what is to be expected for Germany. When we divide the
year into summer and winter we get a low capacity factor in the winter and a high
capacity factor in the summer and an annual capacity factor of about 12%. We
assume that these capacity factors are representative for all countries in the model,
thus we assume they have similar insolation. IEA presents capacity factors for dif-
ferent utility scale generators in the US. These are higher than the capacity factors
we have calculated based on data for Germany, however the average insolation in
Germany is lower than the US. Thus we decided to use the capacity factors based
on the EEX transparency platform.
The wind capacity factors are based on a study (Sinden, 2007) conducted for on-
shore installations in the UK. Due to lack of data we assume these capacity factors
are representative for all countries represented in the model. With increasing off-
shore installations the capacity factor for wind is likely to increase, but this is not
reflected in our data set.
Because we assume the same capacity factors for sun and wind for all countries
represented in the model we loose some dynamics. Denmark can have high wind
production when the UK does not and the other way around. The sun may not
shine at the same time and as much in Sweden as in Germany. However the
representation of this kind of dynamics would be more important if we had a finer
time resolution. Then we could model situations where transmission capacity is
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needed one way one day and the other way the next.
The marginal production costs vary in different papers. This is not public informa-
tion. Thus it has to be calculated based on assumptions of among others, efficiency,
emissions and operation hours of different plant types. We checked the prices pre-
sented in Doorman and Frøystad (2013) using their fuel prices, a carbon price of
14 e/MWh and the method presented in Traber and Kemfert (2011). Using this
method we got slightly higher costs for natural gas and lower costs for oil than the
costs presented in Doorman and Frøystad (2013). As the marginal costs in Door-
man and Frøystad (2013) were more similar to the costs presented in other papers,
we decided to use these costs in the model. In reality the marginal production cost
is dependent on plant type, not just fuel, but this is not reflected in our model. We
do however believe the level of detail is sufficient given the aggregation level of the
model.
We assume the real costs will stay the same in 2020. Improved technologies would
decrease the costs, but increased fuel and carbon prices would increase the costs.
Fuel costs could increase due to increased demand from emerging markets and
are thus dependent on the world economy. The carbon price will increase if EU
succeeds in revitalizing the EU ETS market, or agree on other renewable policies to
increase the cost of emitting CO2. It is however worth noting that neither Exxon4,
nor Statoil5 deem such a scenario particularly likely when reporting on climate
change risk and strategies for climate change.
When calculating the linear, inverse demand curves we assume the same reference
price for all countries. This is not quite accurate as there are some electricity price
differences between European countries.
4http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/environment/climate-change/managing-climate-
change-risks/carbon-asset-risk
5lhttp://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/Downloads/Statoil%20response
%20to%20Ceres%20letter%209%20October%202013.pdf
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Chapter 7
Implementation
This chapter presents important aspects of the implementation of the models pre-
sented in Chapters 4 and 5. Section 7.1 describes GAMS and the solvers used to
run the models. 7.2 describes how the Ks are chosen. Hardware specifications are
given in Section 7.3.
7.1 Software
The implementation of the models from chapter 4 and 5 was done using the The
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) IDE version 24.1.3. GAMS is "a
high level modeling language for the compact representation of large and complex
models" (Rosenthal, 2013). The software allows model representations to be inde-
pendent of solution algorithm and accommodates solving of mixed complementarity
problems as well as linear, nonlinear, mixed integer and mixed integer nonlinear
optimization problems. A detailed introduction to the GAMS language and syntax
can be found in Rosenthal (2013).
GAMS does not directly solve the problem, but uses a solver chosen by the user.
The model in Chapter 4 is a quadratic optimization problem which we solve using
a NLP solver. As the CONOPT solver proved to solve our problem efficiently, we
chose to use this solver. The model in chapter 5 is reformulated as an MINLP. The
model has a non-convex objective function and therefore require a global solver
such as BARON.
CONOPT, developed by Arne Drud, is an nonlinear programming (NLP) algorithm
which finds local optima (Drud (2013)). For convex models CONOPT will find
the global solution. The solver is built for non-linear, large and sparse models.
CONOPT has considerable build-in logic which selects the solution approach that
seems most suited given information from the model. The approach is adjusted
dynamically as new information about the model is revealed. Models solve more
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easily with CONOPT if initial values are provided. Also, good bounds on variables
and proper scaling will ease the solution process.
Developed by Nick Sahinidis, the Branch-And-Reduce Optimization Navigator
(BARON) solver is guaranteed to find a global solution of nonlinear (NLPs) and
mixed-integer nonlinear programs (MINLP) (Sahinidis (2013)). The algorithm con-
sists of two parts; the reduce and the branch part. The reduce part of the solver’s
algorithm combines constraints progagation, interval analysis, and duality. The al-
gorithm’s branch part utilizes advanced branch-and-bound optimization concepts.
The solver requires all variables to have finite bounds. If not provided by the
modeler, BARON will set upper and lower bound to variables using the model
constraints.
7.2 Choosing the Values for the Disjunctive Con-
straint Parameters
As mentioned in section 2.4.4, choosing good values of the Ks in the disjunctive con-
straints approach is important and challenging. No general procedure for choosing
good Ks exist, as the values of the Ks are problem specific.
The Ks should be as small as possible, yet still so big that optimal solutions are not
cut out of the feasible region of the model. If the Ks are too big, the mix between
large and small model parameters may cause solver calculation errors. GAMS
solvers find it challenging to run models where parameters have very different
magnitude. For example, given a minimization problem, the GAMS solvers may
experience finding decreased objective value after adding integer cuts. This does
not make sense as integer cuts worsen the objective function value. The reason for
these calculation errors is that if the solver encounters big and small parameters,
the solver might choose to round the small numbers to zero. This happened in the
example above, where the result was wrongly calculated search directions. Proper
scaling of the model can help avoiding this problem.
The best way to find good Ks is to use information from the model data. Finding
good bounds on primal variables is rather straightforward as they usually relate to
physical amounts with known upper limit. The challenge is to set good bound on
the dual variables. It might be rewarding to think of the duals as shadow prices,
i.e marginal costs of one more unit. This may give an idea of the value of the dual.
Also, solving a small instance of the model can give additional insights in what
level the duals will take.
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7.3 Hardware
The models have been run on an HP desktop computer using Windows 7. It has
an Intel Core i7 CPU with 16 GB RAM running at 3.4 HZ.
We could not find a feasible solution to the largest instance of the zonal transmission
planner model in 24 hours. A faster processor would solve more nodes in the
branch-and-bound tree in the same time, and therefore maybe bring the solution
time down. For the same reason, solving the branch-and-bound tree using parallel
runs could also increase the chances of finding feasible solutions. However, we
cannot say this for sure as we do not know how far away the solver is from the
feasible solution.
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Chapter 8
Computational Results and
Analysis
This chapter summarizes results from test instances of the models presented in
Chapter 4 and 5. We start by presenting preliminary results in Section 8.1. Section
8.2 reports on the market outcome with the initial transmission capacity. This is
compared to the results from the supranational planner and the zonal planner. For
the zonal planner we consider both no cost sharing and bilateral cost sharing. We
illustrate the conflicting objectives and the effect of cost sharing by comparing the
outcomes for the different planners.
The effect of the long term planning horizon is illustrated by comparing the solu-
tion for supranational planner planning for one year and a supranational planner
planning for two years.
As we discuss in Section 8.1 we are only able to solve the model for the zonal
planner for small instances, thus we use an aggregated version of the data set
presented in Chapter 6 to analyze the outcomes for the different planners. In the
reduced data set we omit Sweden and aggregate Germany and the Netherlands to
"DENE". We also aggregate all thermal capacity, including biomass and nuclear,
to one generation type and include only two time periods.
Finally we perform a sensitivity analysis with focus on how different demand and
generation input parameters influence the solution.
8.1 Preliminary Testing
In this section we report on the solution times for the various models, and show
that the upper and lower bounds of the zonal planner model converge.
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The number of continuous and binary variables, running time and final solution
gap is presented in Table 8.1. The supranational transmission planner models used
the CONOPT solver. The zonal transmission planner models were solved using
BARON.
Time periods Nodes Fuels Variables Binary Variables Solution time Relative gap
No Investment 2 4 4 121 0 0 0
Supranational planner 2 4 4 121 0 0 0
Norway as zonal planner, 2 4 4 401 168 02:23:00 0.009no cost sharing
Norway as zonal planner, 2 4 4 417 178 00:00:10 0.00337bilateral cost sharing
Norway as zonal planner, 4 4 4 785 336 > 24:00:00 -no cost sharing
Supranational planner 4 4 4 225 0 0 0
Supranational planner 4 6 8 469 0 0 0
Table 8.1: Solution report for all models
As can be see from Table 8.1 that we were not able to solve the zonal transmission
planner model for the biggest data set. Therefore, we solve the models for a reduced
data set which contains four nodes, four fuels and two time periods. The nodes
are Norway, Denmark, DENE and the UK. The DENE is an aggregation of the
data for Germany and the Netherlands. Demand of this zone is set to Germany’s
as reference consumption for this zone is substantially larger than Netherlands’.
The seasonal data is aggregated in order to represent the years 2010 and 2020.
Thus, we represent single years instead of years with two seasons. We also reduce
the amount of fuels in the market from eight to four. Generation capacity for oil,
gas, coal, nuclear and biomass are aggregated into the fuel type "Thermal". The
generation cost of this fuel is the weighted average of generation costs with respect
to capacity, meaning we multiply the cost of generation with the share of generation
for all generation types.
In terms of convergence for the MPEC we see from Figure 8.1 that the upper and
lower bounds converge. When we set Norway as leader in the MPEC we saw that
BARON found many feasible solutions throughout the solution time as illustrated
in Figure 8.1. This is not uncommon for non convex problems as discussed in
section 2.5
For the zonal planner we saw that BARON reported the first solution that met
the relative optimality criteria. Due to our familiarity with the model we could
conclude that the reported solution was not the global optimum. Thus, the relative
optimality criteria was changed from the default setting at 0.1 to 0.0009 in order
to minimize the risk of reporting a local solution rather than the globally optimal
solution.
In general the solver finds more feasible solutions to models making transmission
investments than to models not investing. For the zonal planner and DENE as
leader the model found a feasible solution early and spent most of the running
time on proving optimality.
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Figure 8.1: Absolute gap for two time periods zonal transmission model all costs
model given Norway as leader. Logarithmic vertical axis.
8.2 Supranational Transmission Planning Model
In this section we report on the solutions from two instances of the supranational
transmission planning model.
8.2.1 Initial Market Outcome
Here we present the results from supranational transmission planning with invest-
ment decisions fixed to zero. This solution will function as a benchmark for the
other results. Market outcome data are presented in Table 8.2 and the transmis-
sion capacities are displayed in Figure 8.2. Grey boxes show the initial transmission
capacities.
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Norway Denmark DENE United Kingdom
2011 2020 2011 2020 2011 2020 2011 2020
Generation 17.129 17.376 2.251 2.496 67.505 58.984 38.357 37.714
Demand 15.429 15.676 4.331 4.513 67.125 58.667 38.357 37.714
Price 0.043 0.047 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052
CS 8.343 2.354 33.511 20.255
PS 0.061 0.127 1.812 0.413
CS + PS 8.404 2.481 35.323 20.668
Investments 0
Investment Cost 0
Social Welfare 66.863
Table 8.2: Market outcome for supranational planner with investments fixed to
zero. Generation and demand is given in GW. Prices are given in e/GWh.
From Table 8.2 we see that generation and demand levels increase slightly in both
time periods for Norway and Denmark. In DENE and the UK, generation and
demand decrease in 2020. This correspond to the input data used in the model.
Prices are equal to the marginal cost of the last generation technology to enter
the production mix, this is known as merit order 1 In all zones consumer surplus
is considerably greater than producer surplus. This is to be expected as the only
profitable generators are those based on hydro and renewable generation because
these are the only fuel types with marginal cost below the electricity price. Most
zones have a very low generation capacity of these fuels. This results in small
producer profits. All lines out of Norway are used at full capacity, i.e they are
congested.
Norway experiences limited export possibilities, as the lines connecting Norway
and the other countries are congested. Thus, Norway is not able to utilize its full
generation capacity. Norway has a large quantity of hydro generation capacity,
which has a marginal cost lower than the electricity price in the other zones. If
Norway’s export capacity ws higher, producer surplus would increase. In turn this
would increase social welfare. Thus, Norway seems to have a potential to increase
social welfare by transmission investments.
1Merit order is a way of organizing the available sources for electricity generation in ascending
order of their marginal production costs. The sources with the lowest marginal costs will be
included in the energy mix first.
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Figure 8.2: Map showing initial transmission grid
8.2.2 The Supranational Transmission Planner
Here we report on the results from the supranational transmission planner mak-
ing investment decisions. Market outcome data are presented in Table 8.3 and the
transmission investments are displayed in Figure 8.3. In the Figure, red boxes indi-
cate new transmission lines, while blue boxes show lines that have been upgraded.
The upper number in the red and blue boxes show the initial transmission capacity.
The lower number show how much the line is upgraded. The sum of the upper and
lower number give the total new transmission capacity.
In Table 8.3 we see that zonal generation vary more between time periods than
in the benchmark case. In Norway generation is higher in 2020 than in 2010. In
Denmark generation stays almost the same in both time periods. In DENE and the
UK, we see that generation decrease in 2020. Demand increase slightly in 2020 for
Norway and Denmark, while it decreases for DENE. Again, this is to be expected
because of the data used in the model. In 2010, electricity prices are the same
throughout the market. In 2020, the price in Norway is slightly lower than in the
rest of the market. As Figure 8.3 show, a new line is built between Norway and the
UK. Upgrades are done on the lines connecting Norway and Denmark. The two
upgraded lines and the line between Norway and DENE are used at full capacity
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in 2020.
Norway Denmark DENE United Kingdom
2011 2020 2011 2020 2011 2020 2011 2020
Generation 28.524 42.884 1.234 1.479 66.488 57.967 28.91 14.144
Demand 15.343 15.579 4.331 4.513 67.125 58.667 38.357 37.714
Price 0.043 0.05 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052
CS 8.246 2.354 33.511 20.255
PS 0.321 0.127 1.812 0.413
CS + PS 8.567 2.481 35.323 20.668
Investments 25.604
Investment Cost 0.044
Social Welfare 66.994
Table 8.3: Market outcome for the supranational planner. Generation and demand
is given in GW. Prices are given in e/GWh.
Figure 8.3: Map showing the supranational planning investment decision
Compared to the no investment situation, we see that market social welfare in-
crease in the supranational planning model. In order to achieve optimal welfare,
the planner will dispatch the cheapest generation first. Thus, the planner will dis-
patch hydro power before introducing thermal energy in the production mix, as
hydro power is cheaper than thermal generation. We see that Norway produces
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more in both 2010 and 2020 when transmission investments are made. In 2020,
installed hydro power generation capacity in Norway has increased. We see that
this increased capacity is only utilized when transmission investments are made.
Consequently, investments are made so the supranational planner can dispatch all
of Norway’s cheap hydro power capacity to countries that have a large share of ther-
mal generation capacity such as the UK and DENE. This explains UK’s decreased
generation in 2020. The raise in generation in Norway has a positive impact on the
zone’s producer surplus. As demand in Norway falls because of higher electricity
prices, compared to the no investment case, Norway’s consumer surplus decrease.
However, the increased producer surplus is high enough to cause a net increase in
Norway’s social welfare. The other zones in the market experience no change in
producer and consumer surplus. This seems reasonable as they did not experience
congested transmission lines in the initial market outcome. Even though the UK
generate less in 2020 compared to the no investment case, it still achieves the same
level of producer surplus as less of the expensive thermal generation is used. Thus,
as a consequence of Norway’s increased social welfare the total social welfare of the
market increases compared to the initial market outcome.
8.3 Zonal Transmission Planner
In this section we present the results from various zonal transmission planners. We
first look at the situation where the zonal planner incurs all the investment cost
and then we look at the effect of bilateral cost sharing.
8.3.1 Norway as Zonal Transmission Planner and No Cost
Sharing
In this section we present the results from letting Norway be the zonal transmission
planner covering all investment costs model. Market outcome data are presented
in Table 8.4 and the transmission investments are displayed in Figure 8.4.
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Norway Denmark DENE United Kingdom
2010 2002 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
Generation 28.524 42.884 3.231 1.479 68.225 61.001 25.176 11.060
Demand 15.343 15.529 4.331 4.513 67.125 58.667 38.357 37.714
Price 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052
CS 8.219 2.354 31.511 20.255
PS 0.348 0.126 1.812 0.413
CS + PS 8.567 2.480 35.323 20.668
CS + PS - INV 8.523 2.480 35.323 20.668
Investment Cost 0.044
Total Social Welfare 66.994
Investments 25.655
Table 8.4: Market outcome for the zonal planner covering all costs. Norway is
leader. Generation and demand is given in GW. Prices are given in e/GWh.
When Norway decides on all investments in the market the market outcome is very
similar to the outcome from the supranational transmission planner.
From Table 8.4 we see that the resulting generation is the same in Norway and
Denmark for this planner as for the supranational model. In DENE, generation
is higher in this situation than the resulting generation from the supranational
planner in both years. In the UK, generation is lower for the supranational model
than the resulting generation for this planner. Demand in Norway is higher in 2020
than in 2010, but compared to the supranational model, demand is lower in 2020
when we look at the results from the zonal planner. Demand in the other zones is
the same. The reduced demand in Norway is due to a slightly higher price for the
zonal planner than for the supranational planner. Consumer surplus is lower and
producer surplus is higher in Norway, however the sum of these is the same as in
the supranational case. Consumer and producer surplus remain the same as the
supranational case for all other zones. The zonal planner investment in a new line
between Norway and the UK and upgrades the lines between Norway and DENE
Norway and Denmark and DENE and UK. We see that investments are done on
the same lines as when we considered the supranational planner. In 2010, the lines
between Norway and Denmark, DENE and Denmark, and the UK and DENE are
congested. In 2020, the lines between Norway and DENE, Norway and the UK
and DENE and the UK are congested.
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Figure 8.4: Map showing investments given Norway as zonal planner covering all
costs. Generation and demand is given in GW. Prices are given in EUR/GWh.
From these results, we see that the optimal strategy for Norway as a zonal leader
is very similar as the optimal strategy of supranational planning. Investments
are made to the same lines and only differ slightly in magnitude. The welfare
allocation is the same. This is not surprising, given the input data to our models.
As we have seen in the supranational planning models in Section 8.2.1 and 8.2.2,
Norway is the only zone whose welfare increases when investments are made. In
order to increase the zonal welfare, Norway invest in lines that facilitate increased
exports from Norway to the other countries. The rationale behind this is that
Norwegian producers increase their surplus when exports are increased. The final
welfare of Norway is lower than for the supranational case, as Norway must cover
all investments costs compared to only 25 % in the latter case.
8.3.2 DENE as Zonal Transmission Planner and No Cost
Sharing
Letting DENE decide on all transmission investments and covering all costs, we see
that the resulting market outcome and investment is the same as the initial market
outcome as presented in Section 8.2. Thus DENE cannot increase its welfare by
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making investment in transmission capacity. We see the same result for Denmark
and the UK as well. Thus, given our input data, Norway is the only country
benefiting from transmission investments. This result highlights the challenges
with different optimal investments plans in transmission planning.
From these results, it looks like Norway experiences a form of prisoner’s dilemma.
If Norway does not invest, it achieves lower welfare than in the supranational case.
However, if Norway does invest, it must cover all investment costs which lowers the
zone’s social welfare. Yet, Norway achieves higher welfare when investing compared
to not investing. Therefore Norway choose to invest in a way that gives the zone a
welfare that is closer to the supranational case.
8.3.3 Norway as Zonal Transmission Planner and Bilateral
Cost Sharing
This section present the results for the zonal transmission model when we introduce
bilateral cost sharing. Market outcome data are presented in Table 8.5 and the
transmission investments are displayed in figure 8.5.
Norway Denmark DENE United Kingdom
2010 2002 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
Generation 28.761 42.884 1.171 1.479 70.225 58.71 24.999 13.351
Demand 15.343 15.529 4.331 4.513 67.125 58.667 38.357 37.714
Price 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052
CS 8.219 2.354 31.511 20.255
PS 0.348 0.126 1.812 0.413
CS + PS 8.567 2.48 35.323 20.668
CS + PS - INV 8.545 2.477 35.323 20.648
Total Investment Cost 0.045
Total Social Welfare 66.994
Investments 25.655
Table 8.5: Market outcome for the zonal planner and bilateral cost sharing. Gen-
eration and demand is given in GW. Prices are given in e/GWh.
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Figure 8.5: Map showing investments given Norway as zonal planner with bilateral
cost sharing
From Table 8.5 we see that the market outcome is very similar to when Norway
was covering the full cost of investments. In Denmark and DENE generation in
2010 is higher than in the other zonal planning model. In UK, generation in 2010
is lower compared to the other zonal model. Norway chooses to upgrade the line
connecting Norway and Denmark, and build a new interconnector between Norway
and the UK. The level of the investments are the same as in the supranational and
other zonal model. All upgraded lines are used at full capacity in 2020.
We see from Table 8.5 that the welfare in Norway is closer to the welfare in the
supranational planner case when we consider bilateral cost sharing than when Nor-
way covers all investment costs. The total social welfare of all countries is the
same as for the supranational and zonal model covering all costs model. This can
be explained by the fact that the increase in social welfare is mainly a result of
increased dispatch of Norwegian hydro power. Hydro power has a lower generation
cost than the electricity price in the other zones and welfare is increased if Norway
utilize its full hydro power generation capacity. Thus, investments are made on
the lines connecting Norway to the other zones. Compared to the situation when
Norway covers all investment costs, the social welfare in Norway increase, while
welfare in Denmark and DENE decrease. This is to be expected as investment
64
costs are now shared between the zones sharing the upgraded line. Hence, we see
that bilateral cost sharing cause a shift in social welfare within the zones in the
market. However, total market welfare remains the same as in the other models.
8.3.4 UK as Zonal Transmission Planner and Bilateral Cost
Sharing
As we saw in the previous section, Norway invests in a similar fashion both when the
country covers all costs associated with the investments and when we introduced
bilateral cost sharing. However the social welfare in the country increases when the
costs are shared bilaterally because the node only covers half the cost associated
with investments. In this section we present the results from the zonal transmission
model with bilateral cost sharing and UK as leader. When Norway acts as the
transmission planner, a large part of the investments are made on the interconnector
between Norway and the UK, however none of the other countries make investments
when they are set as leaders. We want to investigate whether bilateral cost sharing
can incentivize UK to make an investment.
The results indicate that this is not the case. No investments are made and the
welfare outcome in the market is the same as in the initial situation before in-
vestments are made. This is not surprising, as we saw that Norway was the only
country where welfare increased after upgrades to the grid. Thus, with our input
data, non of the other countries benefit from transmission investments and will not
make investments if they have to cover any part of the cost.
8.4 Comparison of Short and Long Term Trans-
mission Planning
In this section we illustrate the importance of a long term planning horizon in
transmission planning by comparing the resulting social welfare for 2020 when the
transmission planner takes both 2010 and 2020 into account when investing to
when the planner takes only the current situation into consideration. In the first
case the planner has a long term perspective and in the latter care she has a short
term planning perspective.
From Table 8.6 we see that the resulting welfare in 2020 is higher when the planner
has a long term planning horizon than when the planner only invests based on the
current situation. Figure 8.6 show the resulting investments when the upgrades are
based on only the current situation. The investments when the planner considers
both years was presented in Figure 8.3 in Section 8.2.
From the transmission maps (Figure 8.3 and 8.6) we see that the short term planner
invests approximately 7000 MW less than the long term planner. The investments
are also made on different lines. The short term planner upgrades the line between
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Short term planner Long term planner
Social Welfare 67.286 67.363
Table 8.6: Social welfare in different planning scenarios
Norway and DENE and DENE and the UK. She also builds a new line between
Norway and the UK. The long term planner also builds a new line between Norway
and the UK, but upgrades the line between Norway and Denmark instead of the
lines between Norway and DENE and DENE and the UK.
We see that if the short term plan would be built there would be a shortage of
transmission capacity in the market by 2020. The lack of sufficient transmission
capacity from Norway to the rest of the market would limit the amount of hydro
capacity exported, i.e Norway’s producer surplus decrease.
Figure 8.6: Map showing the supranational planner’s investments considering only
2010
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8.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to understand how the models behave when the input data is changed, we
perform a sensitivity analysis on selected data. We start by looking at the impact
of reducing the number of time periods from four to two time periods has on the
model solutions.
As the generation capacity and demand predictions for 2020 are subject to a high
level of uncertainty, we choose to see what happens to the models if this data
is changed. The changes in these parameters only affected the magnitude of the
results and not the conclusions drawn from them, thus we conduct the sensitivity
analysis on the supranational transmission planning model.
From conducting the sensitivity analysis, we noticed that somewhat extreme al-
terations to the input data are required in order to change the conclusions from
Section 8.2 and 8.3. When we drastically increased the demand and reduced the
generation capacity in DENE, we were able to show that the supranational plan-
ning model chose to invest in other lines than our results showed. However, these
data changes were highly unrealistic, and we will not elaborate on them further.
8.5.1 Impact of Time Periods
In this section we look at the impact of changing the number of time periods from
four to two for the supranational transmission planner. In Section 8.1, we saw
that the problem size proved not to be solvable for the zonal transmission planner
as this problem is much harder than the model in Chapter 5. Thus, we solved
all models for a smaller data set containing two time periods instead of four time
periods, in which we lost the seasonal aspect of the models.
To analyze the impact of reducing the number of time periods we compare the
results from a supranational planner with two and four time periods. The results
show that the investments are done on the same lines. The magnitude of the
investment is higher when we consider four time periods. In both versions of the
model the electricity prices are the same. We notice that there is a variation in
demand, generation and electricity flow between the seasons when we include four
time periods. These variations disappear in the two time periods version.
Thus, we see that seasonal variations cause higher investments as some zones may
need extra transmission capacity during particular seasons. However, zonal and
market social welfare is approximately the same in the four and two time periods
models. Thus, even though we loose seasonal insight when reducing the number of
time periods we still end up with similar solutions.
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8.5.2 Demand 2020
We test the sensitivity of the demand parameter by first increasing and then de-
creasing the demand in 2020 with 20 % for each zone. All other parameters are
fixed. When demand in 2020 increases so does social welfare. Full results can be
found in Appendix C
The supranational model invests on the same lines as the original model in Section
8.2.2. The magnitude of the investments have increased as more transmission
capacity is needed to provide electricity generated from hydro power to zones with
thermal generation capacity. Electricity prices are the same as before as all fuels
already were in the generation mix. As consumer welfare increase due to the
increased demand, social welfare in all zones increases.
When demand decreases, social welfare decreases in all zones. This is expected
due to decreased demand, and in turn consumer welfare. Investments are done
on the same lines as before. However, as the need for imports of cheap hydro
power has decreased, less investments in capacity is needed. Electricity prices
stay the same when changing the demand, due to the same reason mentioned in
the previous paragraph. Thus, we conclude that demand data have impact on
the amount of social welfare in the market, but neither on where investments are
made nor electricity prices. However, changes in demand data does not change the
conclusions we reached in Sections 8.2 and 8.3.
8.5.3 Generation Capacity 2020
In this section we test the models sensitivity towards changes in generation capacity
in 2020. We first increase and then decrease generation capacity by 50 % in all
zones. All other parameters are fixed.
When generation capacity is increased by 50 %, the social welfare of the market
increased. Norway is the zone with the highest share of hydro power, which is
cheaper than thermal generation. Thus, Norway will export most of its available
hydro power generation to zones with a large share of thermal generation. This
increases the need for transmission capacity. Even though the level of generation
for all fuels increases, thermal generation is still in the production mix which means
electricity prices stay the same compared to the supranational plan in Section 8.2.2.
Producers experience a higher profit than in the supranational case as they have
more cheap generation they can sell at a high price. This cause an increase of the
overall social welfare in the market.
As generation capacity goes down, so does social welfare. The amount of generation
cheaper than thermal is reduced, i.e there is less exports in the market. This reduces
the need for additional transmission capacity. The model still invests on the same
lines, however the upgrades are small compared to the supranational model in
section 8.2.2. Producer surplus in reduced as the amount of cheap generation
has decreased. Thus, social welfare decrease in all zones. From these results, we
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conclude that 2020 generation capacity data have impact on the level of investments
made in the market. However, changes in generation capacity do not alter the
overall conclusions.
8.5.4 Generation Capacity and Demand in 2020
In this section we look at the impact of changing generation and demand data in
2020 simultaneously. The 2020 generation capacity for all fuels are reduced by 50
%. Demand is increased by 20 % in all zones. All other parameters are fixed.
With the generation and demand data altered, the supranational model still choose
to invest on the same lines as in the supranational model in Section 8.2.2. The level
of investments are lower compared to the results of the original model. Norway
choose to export electricity to the other zones, as Norway has a large share of hydro
power and electricity prices are higher than the generation cost for hydro power.
Compared to the solution of the supranational model in section 8.2.2, producer
surplus is lower as profits are reduced. However, the increased demand has a
positive impact on consumer welfare in all zones. Thus, social welfare increase
when changing generation capacity and demand data for 2020 simultaneously.
8.5.5 Concluding Remarks
This sensitivity analysis have showed that the data does not impact the overall
decision on where to invest, but how much to invest. Thus, data must be chosen
carefully, as using the "wrong" data can lead to over-or under-investments, which
in turn reduce social welfare.
Chapter 9
Discussion and Further Work
In this chapter we discuss the various limitations of the model and methods used
and consider possible extensions. Some limitations are discussed in Section 9.1 and
assumptions affecting the validity of the results are discussed in Section 9.2. Section
9.3 discusses the limitations of the solution approach. Some policy implications
based on research insights are given in Section 9.4 and the chapter concludes with
some suggestions for further work in Section 9.5.
9.1 Limitations of the Model
Many simplifications and assumptions are made when building a model. This is
a natural part of modeling. There is a trade off between a realistic representation
and the ease, or even possibility, of computing a solution. It is however important
to be aware of how these simplifications and assumptions influence the quality of
the solution.
The main limitations of our model is the technical representation of the grid, the
exogenous generation capacity, the lack of uncertainty in modeling the renewable
sources and the time resolution. Also the model only considers economic aspects.
Other objectives like reliability of the power system or minimization of unused
capacity is no taken into account.
We have modeled the flow in the network by pure transportation using one di-
rectional arc-flows. With this approach we omit losses, ramping conditions on
transmission lines and Kirchoff’s laws. The main limitation of this is the lack of
representation of loop flows. A full AC representation of the grid would solve this,
but would also cause the feasible region to be non-linear and non-convex, including
trigonometric functions. We use the Baron solver (Sahinidis, 2013) to solve our
model. This solver handles non-convexities and non-linearities, but does not yet
handle trigonometric functions. Consequently an AC representation does not work
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with our solution approach. The DC load flow approach results in a linear feasi-
ble region and represents loop flows in a good way. This approach was not used
because our model only considers cross border interconnectors and not the distri-
bution grid within the countries, and thus has a high aggregation level. Modeling
of the distribution and transmission grids within the individual countries is beyond
the scope of this thesis, but could be an interesting extension.
The generation capacities are given as parameters to the model. This does not allow
us to consider possible generation capacity investment responses to changes in the
transmission topology. New transmission capacity will affect the market clearing
and can thus provide incentives for power generators to invest in new generation
capacity. See for example Sauma and Oren (2006) or Pozo et al. (2013) for a discus-
sion of this effect. However, because we include two different years in our data set,
the transmission planner does have to plan for two different generation capacity
situations. As we saw in the results chapter in Section 8.3 the different generation
capacity situations do affect the optimal transmission expansion plans. The 2020
generation capacities are based on various projections and one can assume that in
some sense these projections constitute generation capacity investment responses
to market developments, among them transmission extensions. Thus we do not
endogenously consider the generation capacity investment response, but the trans-
mission planner has to consider both the generation capacity today and changing
capacities in the future.
The model is deterministic and has a seasonal or yearly time resolution depend-
ing on the size of the problem instance. As we saw in the results chapter 8 the
lack of stochasticity in the modeling of renewable sources cause the model to rely
too much on these. The supply of renewable sources is uncertain and dependent
on stochastic climatic factors. Furthermore future investments in new renewable
generation capacity is dependent on the development of various renewable energy
support schemes. The outcomes of these decisions are not certain.
The combination of no uncertainty in available generation capacity and marginal
cost equal to zero makes the renewable sources very attractive. It is basically free
generation capacity. Uncertainty could reduce the utilization of these sources and
increase willingness to pay for transmission capacity.
We represent the seasonality of renewable sources using capacity factors, but supply
also varies throughout the day. To be able to capture this effect a higher time
resolution is necessary, but due to the long solution time for even small problem
instances we did not increase the time resolution.
The objective function maximizes the sum of consumer and producer surplus less
transmission investment cost and thus limits the model to considering economic
aspects. The reliability of the grid, the amount of undispatched capacity and the
amount of renewable sources in the energy mix are also important aspects to con-
sider when planning transmission expansions. Including reliability of the power
system as a variable to be maximized by the transmission planner could for in-
stance reduce the utilization of variable energy sources. However we considered
71
the economic aspects to be most important when analyzing national strategic in-
vestments.
Despite many limitations we believe that our model provides research insight into
national strategic investments in transmission capacity.
9.2 Validity of Results
As discussed in Section 6.5 the assumptions made in the data set will affect the
quality of the solution. Furthermore the problem instance had to be reduced to be
able to solve the zonal planner’s problem in reasonable time.
The original data set includes six nodes representing Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The data set also has eight
different fuels and four time periods. This allowed us to model a diverse generation
portfolio and two seasons per year. The countries represented are most of the
countries comprised in the North and Baltic Seas Grid infrastructure project. This
is one of the large infrastructure projects mentioned in Section 2.2 and the number
one priority project for "European infrastructure projects for 2020 and beyond"
(European Comission, 2010b). Thus we consider this a reasonable selection of
countries to model, and the data set to be large enough to give insights into national
strategic investments in transmission capacity in this region.
In the reduced problem instance we omit Sweden, aggregate Germany and the
Netherlands in one node, aggregate all thermal capacity, and include only two time
periods. This affects the validity of the results in a negative direction. The most
important countries with respect to generation mix are still included in the model,
but the reduction of time periods means we no longer represent the seasonality
of the renewable generation capacity. This means we no longer represent any
variability and these sources basically have the same characteristics as other energy
sources in the model.
When variability of renewable energy sources and reliability of the grid is not
considered by the model the utilization of variable renewable energy becomes too
high compared to a more realistic situation. If these aspects were modeled we may
have seen that other countries than Norway could have benefited from transmission
investments.
The validity of the results is also affected by the fact that the national power
grids will probably not be able to handle the interconnector upgrades planned by
the model. A more realistic outcome could be produced by modeling the national
transmission grids or include a capacity restriction on the transmission investments
to a capacity that the national power grids are likely to be able to handle. This
however raises the nontrivial issue of how to determine this capacity.
We represent demand using a linear inverse demand curve. This is a fair assumption
to make. It is a very common simplification and allows us to identify marginal
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improvements in consumer surplus. However the demand functions are calculated
based on the same price for all countries in the data set. In reality the prices differ
across countries.
Due to the large amounts of hydroelectric generation capacity in Norway and Swe-
den, a better representation of the water values would be an advantage. This would
allow us to take into account the flexibility of hydro power and the effect of dry
and wet years. The water values are in reality specific for each individual reservoir.
This is among other things due the filling degrees in the reservoirs. One solution
could be to calculate the water values using a separate model and then feed these
in to our model. This is however beyond the scope of this thesis.
We have also excluded some generation capacity, like geothermal, run of river and
pumped storage, from the model. The generation capacity from these sources is
relatively small compared to other sources, however adding them to the model
would add realism.
9.3 Limitations of the Solution Method
The zonal planner’s problem is difficult to solve due to the complexity of the ob-
jective function and the disjunctive constraint representation of the feasible region.
One important weakness of the disjunctive constraint approach is how sensitive it is
to the choice of the K-parameters. Poorly chosen values of these parameters could
cause numerical errors or even cut the optimal solution from the feasible region.
Furthermore a large number of binary variables are added to the problem when
this approach is used, and this increases the difficulty of solving the problem.
The objective function in the upper level of the zonal planner’s problem is non-
linear and non-convex. Consequently it is hard to find a global optimal solution as
was discussed in Section 2.5 and as we saw when investigating the solution times
in Section 8.1. We have used the BARON solver to solve the problem. The solver
handles the non-convexities of the objective function for small instances, but larger
instances can not be solved within reasonable time. In some cases the first feasible
solution found turns out to be the optimal solution and most of the solution time
is spent on proving optimality. In other cases new and better feasible solutions are
found throughout the solution time. This confirms known difficulties with global
optimization as discussed in Section 2.5.
A different representation of the feasible region without binary variables could help
reduce the solution time, but the non-linear and non-convex objective function
renders the problem difficult regardless of this.
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9.4 Policy Implications
Transmission expansion may change the allocation of costs and benefits in a meshed
network. Both different stakeholders in the power market and nations as a whole
could be affected. This possible re-allocation of benefits arising from transmis-
sion capacity extensions in meshed networks should be taken into account when
designing policies to incentivice the building of additional capacity.
Different national states could have incentive to under- or over invest compared
to the supranationally optimal solution. Moreover different national states could
have conflicting optimal plans. Thus it is difficult to find an equilibrium between
the different national strategic planners.
Both benefits and costs have to be taken into account in order to find an equi-
librium. As long as transmission planning is a national prerogative supranational
plans have to be incentive compatible to be accepted by all nations involved. Po-
litical feasibility of transmission investment decisions depend on acceptable cost
and benefit allocations, thus there is a need to better understand the effect of
transmission expansion on the distribution of welfare.
One approach is to design good compensation mechanisms. The European inter-
TSO compensation mechanism, which is meant to compensate TSOs for the costs
associated with hosting transit flows, is an example of such a mechanism. Results
from our models indicate that welfare increases can be large compared to the nec-
essary investment costs. Thus a compensation mechanism to reallocate some of
the benefits associated with investments could be a feasible approach. One major
difficulty in designing compensation mechanisms is to define a benchmark against
which to compare the increase or decrease in costs and benefits resulting from a ca-
pacity investment, and to isolate the effect of transmission investments from other
developments in the energy market.
Another approach could be to develop an EU wide organization for supranational
network planning. In Australia and the US there has been a clear policy move
towards "the introduction of a single entity with planning responsibility" (Frontier
Economics Ltd., 2008). These planning entities are usually partly independent with
respect to the interests of other agents in the power market. Thus this constitutes
a move towards more supranational planning.
The main implication is that policy makers have to be aware of the possible re-
allocations of welfare caused by transmission investments when designing new poli-
cies. This re-allocation also complicates the identification of new projects for fur-
ther development and presupposes better cooperation between TSOs.
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9.5 Further Work
The models proposed in this thesis can be further improved by addressing some of
the weaknesses discussed in this chapter.
As discussed in Section 9.1 a significant assumption made is to have no restrictions
on the transmission investment. In doing this we implicitly assume that the na-
tional transmission and distribution grids are able to handle the new capacities of
the interconnectors. This is probably not the case. Norway, Sweden and Denmark
are for instance divided into price areas due to internal congestion. Therefore a
good extension would be to include national grids to the model. This could be done
in a simplified way by dividing the countries into regions and include investments
in transmission capacity between the regions within a country.
Other details that could be added to the model are higher time resolution, technical
constraints on the grid and generation capacity and exogenous water values from
a separate model. Adding uncertainty to the model by letting renewable power
generation be stochastic would be interesting, and would also add more realism to
the model. However adding these features to the model would also increase the
size of the problem and hence the solution time. Given the current solution time
we would not recommend this as a first choice for further work.
Due to long solution times further research should be directed towards improve-
ments to the solution method. Investigation into the possibilities of linearizing the
objective function could also help reduce the solution time. A representation of
the feasible region like those presented in Ruiz et al. (2012) and Huppmann and
Egerer (2014) could also improve the solution time as binary variables are avoided.
The development of a heuristic solution method could also be a path for further
research.
The model could also be used to analyze the effect of various compensation mecha-
nisms and cost sharing regimes. As discussed in relation to the policy implications
in Section 9.4, better understanding of how such mechanisms affect the distribution
of welfare is needed in order to move towards a supranational planning solution.
The MPEC could also be used to model an EPEC to model a multiple leader,
common follower situation where each country act as a leader and the market
clearing in the common power market constitute the follower as is done in Bjus
and Belmans (2012).
Chapter 10
Concluding Remarks
In this master’s thesis we have analyzed national strategic investments in trans-
mission capacity using a bi-level model where a transmission planner decides on
transmission investments on the upper level and the lower level represents the mar-
ket clearing in the power market. National strategic investments refers to the fact
that different transmission investment plans can change the welfare distribution
between countries in a meshed network, and consequently different nations can
decide on transmission investments strategically to maximize the welfare in their
country.
The research on national strategic investments in transmission capacity is moti-
vated by the necessary upgrades of the European transmission grid to be able to
meet the growing demand for electricity.
Moreover new flow patterns caused by increased trade due to electricity market
liberalization and increased shares of renewable energy in the energy mix is causing
increased stress on the grid. Increased market coupling of the national energy
markets in the EU also means transmission capacity upgrades are becoming an
increasingly multilateral question.
We analyzed national strategic investments by comparing a supranational planner
to a zonal planner. The supranational planner maximizes the welfare of all nodes
in a market, whereas the zonal planner maximizes the welfare of a single node. For
the zonal planner we compared a situation where the zonal planner has to bear all
the costs associated with network upgrades and a bilateral cost sharing situation.
When the costs are shared bilaterally each country pays half the investment cost
for any line connected to it.
The model for the supranational planner reduced to a single level optimization
problem as the objectives of the upper and lower level were aligned. This problem
solved easily for the instances we tested. When we considered the zonal planner,
the objectives of the upper and lower level no longer aligned and we had to solve an
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MPEC. We used a disjunctive constraint approach to represent the complementary
constraints of the lower level when we solved the MPEC. This resulted in a large
number of binary variables which increased the difficulty of solving the problem.
Furthermore the objective function of the upper level problem is non-linear and
non-convex, rendering the problem quite difficult to solve. We used the BARON
solver (Sahinidis, 2013) in GAMS, which is able to handle non-linearities and non-
convexities, but we were only able to solve the MPEC for small problem instances.
We tested the model on a data set representing countries in Northern Europe. The
results showed that the optimal investment plans differed between different leader
nodes. This illustrates the difficulty of finding an equilibrium for a set of individual
planners.
When we looked closer at the resulting welfare of the node representing Norway
we found an interesting result. The resulting welfare of Norway was higher when
we looked at the results from the supranational planner than when Norway acted
as the leader node. This is counter intuitive. One would expect a node to obtain
higher welfare as leader than as part of the market. This could indicate a form
of prisoner’s dilemma situation where Norway looses when investing, but looses
even more when not investing. This hypothesis was confirmed by running the
zonal planner model with Norway as leader and the investments fixed to zero, and
seeing that the resulting welfare for Norway was lower here than when it was able
to make investments. Thus it seamed like the welfare was reduced because the
leader node had to pay the full costs of making the transmission investment. This
was confirmed when we introduced bilateral cost sharing, meaning the leader no
longer incurred all the transmission investment costs, and the welfare in Norway
increased compared to when Norway had to pay all the investment costs. If we
compare these results to the benchmark result before any investments are made we
see that Norway is the only node whose welfare increase when the supranational
planner makes investments.
Our model takes two different years, 2010 and 2020, into account when deciding
on the optimal transmission investments. This done because transmission invest-
ments are long term. We illustrate the importance of this long term perspective
by comparing the optimal investment plans resulting from a supranational planner
considering only a single year. We see that these plans are different from each
other, and that the optimal plan for the 2010 situation is no longer optimal in
2020.
Initially our data set included four time periods. This allowed us to split a year into
two seasons, winter an summer. This was done to include variations in demand
and in the supply from renewable sources. However we had to reduce the problem
instance to two time periods to be able to solve the model for the zonal planner. In
our sensitivity analysis we therefore investigated the effect of reducing the number
of time periods by comparing the solution for the supranational planner for two and
four time periods. Here we saw that the increased variability obtained by including
seasons increased the transmission investments, but the investments were made on
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the same lines as when seasons were not included. Thus the overall conclusion
stays the same when seasonality is excluded from the model. We also conduct a
sensitivity analysis on demand and generation data and saw that changing these
parameters have a large impact on the overall results from the model.
The results from our model indicate that policy makers have to be aware of the
possible re-allocations of welfare caused by transmission investments when design-
ing new policies. We saw that in general investment costs were low compared to
the welfare gain in the market when we considered the supranational planner. This
motivates research into the development of good compensation mechanisms to con-
trol the distribution of costs and benefits in the market in order to facilitate a move
towards a supranationally optimal solution.
Although the presented models does not include all aspects of the power market,
we have demonstrated that it can be used to provide insight into national strategic
investments in transmission capacity. Further work should focus on improving the
solution method in order to reduce the solution time so further details can be added
to the model.
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Appendix A
Zonal Transmission Planner
Reformulation Using
Disjunctive Constraints
The complete mixed integer linear problem formulation of the MPEC problem for
the zonal planner includes both the discrete linearization of the non-linear terms in
the objective function and the disjunctive formulation of the lower level constraints.
The resulting model formulation is as follows:
A.1 Leader covers all costs
min w =
∑
n∈Nl,t
(−0.5 ·Bn,t · d2n,t) (A.1)
+
∑
n∈Nl,f,t
CGENn,f,t · qprodn,f,t −
∑
m,t
pm,t · qsoldn,m
−
∑
m,t
flown,m,t ∗ ptn,m,t +
∑
n,m
CINVn,m · xn,m ∀m
s.t
xn,m ≤ 100 (A.2)
−An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≥ 0 (A.3)
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−An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≤ K1a · r1n,t (A.4)
dn,t −K1b ·
(
1− r1n,t
) ≤ 0 (A.5)
CGn,f,t + γn,f,t + φn,t ≥ 0 (A.6)
CGn,f,t + γn,f,t + φn,t ≤ K2a · r2n,f,t (A.7)
qprodn,f,t −K2b ·
(
1− r2n,f,t
) ≤ 0 (A.8)
− φn,t − ptn,m,t − pelm,t ≥ 0 (A.9)
− φn,t − ptn,m,t − pelm,t ≤ K3a · r3n,m,t (A.10)
qsoldn,m,t −K3b ·
(
1− r3n,m,t
) ≤ 0 (A.11)
n,m,t + m,n,t + ptn,m,t ≥ 0 (A.12)
n,m,t + m,n,t + ptn,m,t ≤ K4a · r4n,m,t (A.13)
flown,m,t −K4b ·
(
1− r4n,m,t
) ≤ 0 (A.14)
− qprodn,f,t + CAPGENn,f,t ·AVn,f,t ≥ 0 (A.15)
− qprodn,f,t + CAPGENn,f,t ·AVn,f,t ≤ K5a · r5n,f,t (A.16)
γn,f,t −K5b ·
(
1− r5n,f,t
) ≤ 0 (A.17)
∑
f
qprodn,f,t −
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t = 0 (A.18)
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flown,m,t − qsoldn,m,t = 0 (A.19)
− flown,m,t + CAPTn,m,t + xn,m + xm,n ≥ 0 ∀n = 1 (A.20)
− flown,m,t + CAPTn,m,t + xn,m + xm,n ≤ K6a · r6n,m ∀n ∈ Nl (A.21)
n,m,t −K6b ·
(
1− r6n,m,t
) ≤ 0 (A.22)
dn,t −
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t = 0 (A.23)
A.2 Bilateral cost sharing
min w =
∑
n∈Nl,t
(−0.5 ·Bn,t · d2n,t) (A.24)
+
∑
n∈Nl,f,t
CGENn,f,t · qprodn,f,t −
∑
m,t
pm,t · qsoldn,m
−
∑
m,t
flown,m,t ∗ ptn,m,t +
∑
n,m
0.5 · CINVn,m · xn,m ∀m
s.t
xn,m ≤ 100 (A.25)
−An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≥ 0 (A.26)
−An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≤ K1a · r1n,t (A.27)
dn,t −K1b ·
(
1− r1n,t
) ≤ 0 (A.28)
CGn,f,t + γn,f,t + φn,t ≥ 0 (A.29)
CGn,f,t + γn,f,t + φn,t ≤ K2a · r2n,f,t (A.30)
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qprodn,f,t −K2b ·
(
1− r2n,f,t
) ≤ 0 (A.31)
− φn,t − ptn,m,t − pelm,t ≥ 0 (A.32)
− φn,t − ptn,m,t − pelm,t ≤ K3a · r3n,m,t (A.33)
qsoldn,m,t −K3b ·
(
1− r3n,m,t
) ≤ 0 (A.34)
n,m,t + m,n,t + ptn,m,t ≥ 0 (A.35)
n,m,t + m,n,t + ptn,m,t ≤ K4a · r4n,m,t (A.36)
flown,m,t −K4b ·
(
1− r4n,m,t
) ≤ 0 (A.37)
0 ≤ 0.5 · CINVn,m −
∑
t
(n,m,t + m,n,t) ≥ 0 (A.38)
0 ≤ 0.5 · CINVn,m −
∑
t
(n,m,t + m,n,t) ≤ K7a · r7n,m (A.39)
xn,m −K7b ·
(
1− r7n,m
) ≤ 0 (A.40)
− qprodn,f,t + CAPGENn,f,t ·AVn,f,t ≥ 0 (A.41)
− qprodn,f,t + CAPGENn,f,t ·AVn,f,t ≤ K5a · r5n,f,t (A.42)
γn,f,t −K5b ·
(
1− r5n,f,t
) ≤ 0 (A.43)
∑
f
qprodn,f,t −
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t = 0 (A.44)
flown,m,t − qsoldn,m,t = 0 (A.45)
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− flown,m,t + CAPTn,m,t + xn,m + xm,n ≥ 0 ∀n = 1 (A.46)
− flown,m,t + CAPTn,m,t + xn,m + xm,n ≤ K6a · r6n,m ∀n ∈ Nl (A.47)
n,m,t −K6b ·
(
1− r6n,m,t
) ≤ 0 (A.48)
dn,t −
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t = 0 (A.49)
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Appendix B
Zonal Transmission Model
with Bilateral Cost Sharing
min w =
∑
n∈Nl,t
(−An,t · dn,t + 0.5 ·Bn,t · d2n,t + pn,t · dn,t) (B.1)
+
∑
n∈Nl,f,t
CGn,f,t · qprodn,f,t −
∑
n∈Nl,f,t
pn,t · qprodn,f,t
+
∑
n∈N l,m
(
0.5 · CINVn,m · xn,m
) ∀m
s.t
0 ≤ xn,m ≥ 0 (B.2)
s.t
0 ≤ −An,t +Bn,t · dn,t + peln,t ≥ 0 ⊥ dn,t ≥ 0 (B.3)
0 ≤ CGENn,f,t + γn,f,t + φn,t ≥ 0 ⊥ qprodn,f,t ≥ 0 (B.4)
0 ≤ −φn,t − ptn,m,t − pelm,t ≥ 0 ⊥ qsoldn,m,t ≥ 0 (B.5)
0 ≤ n,m,t + m,n,t + ptn,m,t ≥ 0 ⊥ flown,m,t ≥ 0 (B.6)
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0 ≤ 0.5 · CINVn,m −
∑
t
(n,m,t − m,n,t) ≥ ⊥ xn,m ≥ 0 (B.7)
0 ≤ −qprodn,f,t + CAPGENn,f,t ·AVn,f,t ≥ 0 ⊥ γn,f,t ≥ 0 (B.8)
∑
f
qprodn,f,t −
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t = 0 ⊥ φn,t free (B.9)
flown,m,t = qsoldn,m ⊥ ptn,m free (B.10)
0 ≤ −flown,m,t + CAPTn,m,t + xn,m + xm,n ≥ 0 ⊥ n,m,t ≥ 0 (B.11)
dn =
∑
m
qsoldn,m,t ⊥ peln free (B.12)
Appendix C
Results Sensitivity Analysis
C.1 Sensitivity of Demand
C.1.1 Demand Down
Norway Denmark DENE The UK
2010 2002 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
Generation 28.761 42.884 2.099 1.479 70.471 47.986 23.878 7.666
Demand 15.343 12.612 4.331 3.544 67.125 52.800 38.357 31.059
Price 0.043 0.050 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052
CS 7.460 2.098 31.962 18.498
PS 0.326 0.126 1.812 0.413
CS + PS 7.786 2.225 33.774 18.911
Investment Cost 0.049
Total Social Welfare 62.648
Investments 28.823
Table C.1: Market outcome supranational model with demand decreased by 20 %
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C.1.2 Demand Up
Norway Denmark DENE The UK
2010 2002 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
Generation 28.655 42.884 2.207 1.479 68.292 87.300 26.001 23.729
Demand 15.343 18.266 4.331 5.126 67.125 88.000 38.357 44.000
Price 0.043 0.050 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052
CS 8.957 2.516 41.255 21.915
PS 0.317 0.126 1.812 0.413
CS + PS 9.274 2.643 43.067 22.328
Investment Cost 0.039
Total Social Welfare 77.272
Investments 22.941
Table C.2: Market outcome supranational model with demand increased by 20 %
C.2 Sensitivity of Generation
C.2.1 Generation Down
Norway Denmark DENE The UK
2010 2002 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
Generation 28.524 19.195 1.171 4.956 65.507 59.318 30.003 32.954
Demand 15.391 15.529 4.331 4.513 67.125 58.667 38.357 44
Price 0.041 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052
CS 8.245 2.354 33.511 20.255
PS 0.160 0.081 0.857 0.150
CS + PS 8.405 2.430 34.363 20.401
Investments 11.432
Investment Cost 0.019
Social Welfare 65.599
Table C.3: Market outcome supranational model with generation decreased by 50
%
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C.2.2 Generaton Up
Norway Denmark DENE The UK
2010 2002 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
Generation 28.761 60.413 3.023 2.381 78.300 46.243 15.072 7.436
Demand 15.343 15.579 4.331 4.513 67.125 58.667 38.357 37.714
Price 0.043 0.050 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.052
CS 8.245 2.354 35.511 20.255
PS 0.369 0.173 1.860 0.322
CS + PS 8.614 2.509 35.353 20.559
Investments 11.432
Investment Cost 0.073
Social Welfare 67.035
Table C.4: Market outcome supranational model generation increased by 50 %
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C.3 Supranational Model with Four Time Periods
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Appendix D
Gams Code
D.1 Supranational Transmission Model
1 Sets
2 n nodes /n1∗n6/
3 f fuels /f1∗f8/
4 t time /t1∗t4/
6 $ontext
7 nodes: 1 2 3 4 5 6
8 NO SE DK DE NL GB
10 fuels:
11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
12 Coal Gas Oil Nuclear Hydro Wind Solar Bio
13 $offtext
15 alias (n,m);
17 table A(n,t)
18 ∗Intercept of inverse demand curve in node n and time t
19 ∗ W2010 S2010 W2020 S2020
20 t1 t2 t3 t4
21 n1 0.660 0.495 0.660 0.495
22 n2 0.660 0.495 0.660 0.495
23 n3 0.660 0.495 0.660 0.495
24 n4 0.660 0.495 0.660 0.495
25 n5 0.660 0.495 0.660 0.495
26 n6 0.660 0.495 0.660 0.495
27 ;
29 table B(n,t)
30 ∗Slope of inverse demand curve in node n and time t
31 ∗ W2010 S2010 W2020 S2020
32 t1 t2 t3 t4
33 n1 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038
101
102
34 n2 0.029 0.032 0.029 0.032
35 n3 0.129 0.118 0.129 0.118
36 n4 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007
37 n5 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
38 n6 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
39 ;
42 table CG(n,f,t)
43 ∗Generation cost for fuel f in node n [EUR/GW]
44 ∗ W2010 S2010 W2020 S2020
45 t1 t2 t3 t4
46 n1.f1 0.036 0.036 0.044 0.044
47 n1.f2 0.061 0.061 0.072 0.072
48 n1.f3 0.150 0.150 0.179 0.179
49 n1.f4 0.0095 0.0095 0.011 0.011
50 n1.f5 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.047
51 n1.f6 0 0 0 0
52 n1.f7 0 0 0 0
53 n1.f8 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.034
54 n2.f1 0.036 0.036 0.044 0.044
55 n2.f2 0.061 0.061 0.072 0.072
56 n2.f3 0.150 0.150 0.179 0.179
57 n2.f4 0.0095 0.0095 0.011 0.011
58 n2.f5 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.047
59 n2.f6 0 0 0 0
60 n2.f7 0 0 0 0
61 n2.f8 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.034
62 n3.f1 0.036 0.036 0.044 0.044
63 n3.f2 0.061 0.061 0.072 0.072
64 n3.f3 0.150 0.150 0.179 0.179
65 n3.f4 0.0095 0.0095 0.011 0.011
66 n3.f5 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.047
67 n3.f6 0 0 0 0
68 n3.f7 0 0 0 0
69 n3.f8 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.034
70 n4.f1 0.036 0.036 0.044 0.044
71 n4.f2 0.061 0.061 0.072 0.072
72 n4.f3 0.150 0.150 0.179 0.179
73 n4.f4 0.0095 0.0095 0.011 0.011
74 n4.f5 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.047
75 n4.f6 0 0 0 0
76 n4.f7 0 0 0 0
77 n4.f8 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.034
78 n5.f1 0.036 0.036 0.044 0.044
79 n5.f2 0.061 0.061 0.072 0.072
80 n5.f3 0.150 0.150 0.179 0.179
81 n5.f4 0.0095 0.0095 0.011 0.011
82 n5.f5 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.047
83 n5.f6 0 0 0 0
84 n5.f7 0 0 0 0
85 n5.f8 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.034
86 n6.f1 0.036 0.036 0.044 0.044
87 n6.f2 0.0375 0.0375 0.072 0.072
88 n6.f3 0.150 0.150 0.179 0.179
89 n6.f4 0.0095 0.0095 0.011 0.011
90 n6.f5 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.047
103
91 n6.f6 0 0 0 0
92 n6.f7 0 0 0 0
93 n6.f8 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.034
94 ;
97 table GCAP(n,f,t)
98 ∗Generation capacity of fuel f in node n in time t [GW]
99 ∗ W2010 S2010 W2020 S2020
100 t1 t2 t3 t4
101 n1.f1 0 0 0 0
102 n1.f2 0.096 0.096 3 3
103 n1.f3 0 0 0 0
104 n1.f4 0 0 0 0
105 n1.f5 28.36 28.36 42 42
106 n1.f6 0.520 0.520 3 3
107 n1.f7 0.010 0.010 0.03 0.03
108 n1.f8 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141
109 n2.f1 0.141 0.141 0.400 0.400
110 n2.f2 0.283 0.283 0.800 0.800
111 n2.f3 0.318 0.318 1 1
112 n2.f4 9.326 9.326 9 9
113 n2.f5 16.47 16.47 28.37 28.37
114 n2.f6 2.899 2.899 5 5
115 n2.f7 0.016 0.016 0.03 0.03
116 n2.f8 3.972 3.972 4 4
117 n3.f1 5.756 5.756 5 5
118 n3.f2 3.283 3.283 2 2
119 n3.f3 0.514 0.514 0.5 0.5
120 n3.f4 0 0 0 0
121 n3.f5 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
122 n3.f6 3.952 3.952 5 5
123 n3.f7 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
124 n3.f8 1.222 1.222 1.5 1.5
125 n4.f1 69.54 69.54 45 45
126 n4.f2 19.78 19.78 38 38
127 n4.f3 2.712 2.712 5 5
128 n4.f4 12.07 12.07 6 6
129 n4.f5 4.784 4.784 4.784 4.784
130 n4.f6 29.10 29.10 60 60
131 n4.f7 25.10 25.10 30 30
132 n4.f8 7.110 7.110 8 8
133 n5.f1 6.558 6.558 8 8
134 n5.f2 17.08 17.08 15 15
135 n5.f3 0.642 0.642 0.500 0.500
136 n5.f4 0.482 0.482 0.500 0.500
137 n5.f5 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
138 n5.f6 2.272 2.272 10 10
139 n5.f7 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146
140 n5.f8 1.596 1.595 1.5 1.5
141 n6.f1 31.39 31.39 15 15
142 n6.f2 36.05 36.05 45 45
143 n6.f3 31.39 31.39 10 10
144 n6.f4 9.920 9.920 5 5
145 n6.f5 1.676 1.676 1.676 1.676
146 n6.f6 6.556 6.556 20 20
147 n6.f7 0.981 0.981 1 1
104
148 n6.f8 3.257 3.257 3.257 3.257
149 ;
152 table AV(n,f,t)
153 ∗Availability generation of type f in node n at time t.
154 ∗ W2010 S2010 W2020 S2020
155 t1 t2 t3 t4
156 n1.f1 1 1 1 1
157 n1.f2 1 1 1 1
158 n1.f3 1 1 1 1
159 n1.f4 1 1 1 1
160 n1.f5 1 1 1 1
161 n1.f6 0.387 0.2 0.387 0.2
162 n1.f7 0.039 0.202 0.039 0.202
163 n1.f8 1 1 1 1
164 n2.f1 1 1 1 1
165 n2.f2 1 1 1 1
166 n2.f3 1 1 1 1
167 n2.f4 1 1 1 1
168 n2.f5 1 1 1 1
169 n2.f6 0.387 0.2 0.387 0.2
170 n2.f7 0.039 0.202 0.039 0.202
171 n2.f8 1 1 1 1
172 n3.f1 1 1 1 1
173 n3.f2 1 1 1 1
174 n3.f3 1 1 1 1
175 n3.f4 1 1 1 1
176 n3.f5 1 1 1 1
177 n3.f6 0.387 0.2 0.387 0.2
178 n3.f7 0.039 0.202 0.039 0.202
179 n3.f8 1 1 1 1
180 n4.f1 1 1 1 1
181 n4.f2 1 1 1 1
182 n4.f3 1 1 1 1
183 n4.f4 1 1 1 1
184 n4.f5 1 1 1 1
185 n4.f6 0.387 0.2 0.387 0.2
186 n4.f7 0.039 0.202 0.039 0.202
187 n4.f8 1 1 1 1
188 n5.f1 1 1 1 1
189 n5.f2 1 1 1 1
190 n5.f3 1 1 1 1
191 n5.f4 1 1 1 1
192 n5.f5 1 1 1 1
193 n5.f6 0.387 0.2 0.387 0.2
194 n5.f7 0.039 0.202 0.039 0.202
195 n5.f8 1 1 1 1
196 n6.f1 1 1 1 1
197 n6.f2 1 1 1 1
198 n6.f3 1 1 1 1
199 n6.f4 1 1 1 1
200 n6.f5 1 1 1 1
201 n6.f6 0.387 0.2 0.387 0.2
202 n6.f7 0.039 0.202 0.039 0.202
203 n6.f8 1 1 1 1
204 ;
105
207 table KAP(n,m,t)
208 ∗Invested capacity on line between node n and m in time t, [GW]
209 ∗ W2010 S2010 W2020 S2020
210 t1 t2 t3 t4
211 n1.n1 100 100 100 100
212 n1.n2 3.595 3.595 3.595 3.595
213 n1.n3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
214 n1.n4 0 0 0 0
215 n1.n5 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700
216 n1.n6 0 0 0 0
217 n2.n1 3.595 3.595 3.595 3.595
218 n2.n2 100 100 100 100
219 n2.n3 2.040 2.040 2.040 2.040
220 n2.n4 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615
221 n2.n5 0 0 0 0
222 n2.n6 0 0 0 0
223 n3.n1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
224 n3.n2 2.040 2.040 2.040 2.040
225 n3.n3 100 100 100 100
226 n3.n4 2.100 2.100 2.100 2.100
227 n3.n5 0 0 0 0
228 n3.n6 0 0 0 0
229 n4.n1 0 0 0 0
230 n4.n2 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615
231 n4.n3 2.100 2.100 2.100 2.100
232 n4.n4 100 100 100 100
233 n4.n5 3.850 3.850 3.850 3.850
234 n4.n6 0 0 0 0
235 n5.n1 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700
236 n5.n2 0 0 0 0
237 n5.n3 0 0 0 0
238 n5.n4 3.850 3.850 3.850 3.850
239 n5.n5 100 100 100 100
240 n5.n6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
241 n6.n1 0 0 0 0
242 n6.n2 0 0 0 0
243 n6.n3 0 0 0 0
244 n6.n4 0 0 0 0
245 n6.n5 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700
246 n6.n6 100 100 100 100
247 ;
249 ∗EUR/GWH
250 table CL(n,m) Investment cost if node 1 is LEADER
251 ∗N:1 2 3 4 5 6
252 ∗ NO SE DK DE NL GB
253 n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6
254 n1 10 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
255 n2 0.0017 10 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
256 n3 0.0017 0.0017 10 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
257 n4 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 10 0.0017 0.0017
258 n5 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 10 0.0017
259 n6 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 10 0.0017 0.0017
260 ;
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263 Variables
264 w Social Welfare in Market
265 p_t(n,m,t) Price of transmission from n to m in time t
266 p_el(n,t) Price of transmission from n to m in time t
267 ;
269 Positive Variables
270 x(n,m) Level of Investment
271 q_prod(n,f,t) Amount of el. produced in n from fuel f at time t
272 q_sold(n,m,t) Amount of el. sold from n to m in time t
273 d(n,t) Demand in node n at time t
274 flow(n,m,t) Flow from n to m in time t
275 ;
277 equations
278 eqnWelfare The objective function
279 eqnGenCap(n,f,t) Generatioon capacity
280 eqnSold(n,t) Amount sold from node n to m
281 eqnFlow(n,m,t) Flow from node n to m
282 eqnFlowCap(n,m,t) Transmission capacity on lines
283 eqnMCC(n,t)
284 ;
286 eqnWelfare..
287 sum((n,t), A(n,t)∗d(n,t) − 0.5∗ B(n,t)∗d(n,t)∗d(n,t))
288 − sum((n,f,t), CG(n,f,t)∗q_prod(n,f,t))
289 − sum((n,m), CL(n,m)∗x(n,m)) =e= w;
291 eqnGenCap(n,f,t)..
292 q_prod(n,f,t) =l= GCAP(n,f,t)∗AV(n,f,t);
294 eqnSold(n,t)..
295 sum(f, q_prod(n,f,t)) − sum(m, q_sold(n,m,t)) =e= 0;
297 eqnFlow(n,m,t)..
298 flow(n,m,t) − q_sold(n,m,t) =e= 0;
300 eqnFlowCap(n,m,t)..
301 flow(n,m,t) + flow(m,n,t) − FCAP(n,m,t) −x(n,m) −x(m,n) =l= 0;
303 eqnMCC(n,t)..
304 d(n,t) − sum(m, q_sold(m,n,t)) =e= 0;
307 Model it / all /;
309 Solve it maximizing w using nlp;
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D.2 Zonal Transmission Model All Costs Covered
1 Sets
2 n nodes /n1∗n4/
3 f fuels /f1∗f4/
4 t time /t1∗t2/
6 $ontext
7 nodes: 1 2 3 4
8 NO DK DENE GB
10 fuels: 1 2 3 4
11 Hydro Solar Wind Thermal
12 $offtext
14 alias (n,m,mm);
16 table A(n,t)
17 ∗Intercept of inverse demand curve in node n and time t
18 ∗ 2010 2020
19 t1 t2
20 n1 0.580 0.580
21 n2 0.580 0.580
22 n3 0.580 0.580
23 n4 0.580 0.580
24 ;
26 table B(n,t)
27 ∗Slope of inverse demand curve in node n and time t
28 ∗ 2010 2020
29 t1 t2
30 n1 0.035 0.034
31 n2 0.124 0.117
32 n3 0.008 0.009
33 n4 0.014 0.014
34 ;
37 table CG(n,f,t)
38 ∗Generation cost for fuel f in node n [EUR/GW]
39 ∗ 2010 2020
40 t1 t2
41 n1.f1 0.04 0.047
42 n1.f2 0 0
43 n1.f3 0 0
44 n1.f4 0.043 0.052
46 n2.f1 0.040 0.047
47 n2.f2 0 0
48 n2.f3 0 0
49 n2.f4 0.043 0.052
51 n3.f1 0.040 0.047
52 n3.f2 0 0
53 n3.f3 0 0
54 n3.f4 0.043 0.052
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56 n4.f1 0.040 0.047
57 n4.f2 0 0
58 n4.f3 0 0
59 n4.f4 0.043 0.052
60 ;
62 $ontext
63 Fuels: 1 2 3 4
64 Hydro Solar Wind Thermal
65 $offtext
67 table GCAP(n,f,t)
68 ∗ Generation capacity of fuel f in node n in time t [EUR/GW]
69 ∗ 2010 2020
70 t1 t2
71 n1.f1 28.37 42
72 n1.f2 0.01 0.03
73 n1.f3 0.520 3
74 n1.f4 0.237 3.141
76 n2.f1 0.009 0.009
77 n2.f2 0.017 0.017
78 n2.f3 3.952 5
79 n2.f4 10.775 9
81 n3.f1 4.821 3.037
82 n3.f2 25.24 30.146
83 n3.f3 31.343 70
84 n3.f4 137.57 127.5
86 n4.f1 1.676 1.676
87 n4.f2 0.981 1
88 n4.f3 6.556 20
89 n4.f4 81.92 68
90 ;
93 table AV(n,f,t)
94 ∗ Availability generation of type f in node n at time t.
95 ∗ 2010 2020
96 t1 t2
97 n1.f1 1 1
98 n1.f2 0.12 0.12
99 n1.f3 0.2935 0.2935
100 n1.f4 1 1
101 n2.f1 1 1
102 n2.f2 0.12 0.12
103 n2.f3 0.2935 0.2935
104 n2.f4 1 1
105 n3.f1 1 1
106 n3.f2 0.12 0.12
107 n3.f3 0.2935 0.2935
108 n3.f4 1 1
109 n4.f1 1 1
110 n4.f2 0.12 0.12
111 n4.f3 0.2935 0.2935
112 n4.f4 1 1
109
113 ;
115 ∗UNIT: GW
116 table FCAP(n,m,t)
117 ∗ Invested capacity on line between node n and m in time t
118 ∗ 2010 2020
119 t1 t2
120 n1.n1 200 200
121 n1.n2 1.000 1.000
122 n1.n3 0.7 0.7
123 n1.n4 0 0
124 n2.n1 1.000 1.000
125 n2.n2 200 200
126 n2.n3 2.1 2.1
127 n2.n4 0 0
128 n3.n1 0.7 0.7
129 n3.n2 2.1 2.1
130 n3.n3 200 200
131 n3.n4 1.000 1.000
132 n4.n1 0 0
133 n4.n2 0 0
134 n4.n3 1.000 1.000
135 n4.n4 200 200
136 ;
138 table CL(n,m)
139 ∗Investment cost if node 1 is leader [EUR/GWH]
140 ∗ NOR DK DENE UK
141 n1 n2 n3 n4
142 n1 10 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
143 n2 10 10 0.0017 0.0017
144 n3 10 10 10 10
145 n4 10 10 10 10
146 ;
149 Parameter
150 K1a /0.06/
151 K1b /70/
152 K2a /0.1/
153 K2b /70/
154 K3a /0.1/
155 K3b /70/
156 K4a /0.1/
157 K4b /70/
158 K5a /150/
159 K5b /0.1/
160 K7a /200/
161 K7b /0.1/
162 ;
164 Variables
165 w1 Social Welfare in leader zone
166 p_el(n,t) Price of electricity
167 p_t(n,m,t) Price of transmission
168 phi(n,t) Dual of produced = sold constraint
169 ;
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171 Positive Variables
172 x(n,m) GWs invested on line from node n to m in time period t
173 q_prod(n,f,t) GWs generated from fuel f at node n in time period t
174 q_sold(n,m,t) GWs sold from node n to node m in time period t
175 d(n,t) Demand in node n at time t
176 flow(n,m,t) Flow on line from node n to node m in time period t
177 gamma(n,f,t) Dual of generation capacity
178 epsilon(n,m,t) Dual of flow capacity
179 ;
181 Binary variables
182 r1(n,t)
183 r2(n,f,t)
184 r3(n,m,t)
185 r4(n,m,t)
186 r5(n,f,t)
187 r6a(n,f)
188 r6b(n,f)
189 r7(n,m,t)
190 ;
192 equations
193 eqnWelfare1
195 ObjDem(n,t)
196 ObjDem(n,t)
197 ObjDem(n,t)
199 ObjProd(n,f,t)
200 ObjProd2(n,f,t)
201 ObjProd3(n,f,t)
203 ObjSold(n,m,t)
204 ObjSold2(n,m,t)
205 ObjSold3(n,m,t)
207 ObjFlow(n,m,t)
208 ObjFlow2(n,m,t)
209 ObjFlow3(n,m,t)
211 GenCap(n,f,t)
212 GenCap2(n,f,t)
213 GenCap3(n,f,t)
215 Sold(n,t)
216 Flow(n,m,t)
218 FlowCap(n,m,t)
219 FlowCap2(n,m,t)
220 FlowCap3(n,m,t)
222 MCC(n,t)
223 ;
225 ∗Leader’s problem: Maximize his own welfare
226 eqnWelfare1.. w1 =e= sum(t, − 0.5∗ B(’n1’,t)∗d(’n1’,t)∗d(’n1’,t))
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227 + sum((t,f), CG(’n1’,f,t)∗q_prod(’n1’,f,t))
228 − sum((m,t), q_sold(’n1’,m,t)∗p_el(m,t))
229 − sum((m,t), flow(’n1’,m,t) ∗p_t(’n1’,m,t))
230 + sum((n,m), CL(n,m)∗x(n,m));
232 ∗Market problem: Maximizing market welfare
234 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to d(n)
236 ObjDem(n,t).. −A(n,t) + B(n,t)∗d(n,t) + p_el(n,t) =g= 0 ;
237 ObjDem2(n,t).. −A(n,t) + B(n,t)∗d(n,t) + p_el(n,t) =l= K1a∗r1(n,t);
238 ObjDem3(n,t).. d(n,t) − K1b∗(1−r1(n,t)) =l= 0 ;
240 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to q_prod
242 ObjProd(n,f,t).. CG(n,f,t) + gamma(n,f,t) + phi(n,t)=g= 0;
243 ObjProd2(n,f,t)..CG(n,f,t) + gamma(n,f,t) + phi(n,t)=l=K2a∗r2(n,f,t);
244 ObjProd3(n,f,t)..q_prod(n,f,t) − K2b∗(1−r2(n,f,t)) =l= 0;
246 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to q_sold
248 ObjSold(n,m,t).. −phi(n,t) − p_t(n,m,t) − p_el(m,t)=g= 0;
249 ObjSold2(n,m,t)..−phi(n,t) − p_t(n,m,t) − p_el(m,t)=l= K3a∗r3(n,m,t);
250 ObjSold3(n,m,t).. q_sold(n,m,t) − K3b∗(1−r3(n,m,t)) =l= 0;
252 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to flow
254 ObjFlow(n,m,t).. epsilon(n,m,t) + epsilon(m,n,t) + p_t(n,m,t) =g= 0;
255 ObjFlow2(n,m,t)..epsilon(n,m,t) + epsilon(m,n,t) + p_t(n,m,t) =l= K4a∗r4(
n,m,t);
256 ObjFlow3(n,m,t).. flow(n,m,t) − K4b∗(1−r4(n,m,t)) =l= 0;
258 ∗q_prod less than Max Prod
260 GenCap(n,f,t)..−q_prod(n,f,t) +GCAP(n,f,t)∗AV(n,f,t) =g= 0;
261 GenCap2(n,f,t).−q_prod(n,f,t) +GCAP(n,f,t)∗AV(n,f,t)=l=K5a∗r5(n,f,t);
262 GenCap3(n,f,t)..gamma(n,f,t) − K5b∗(1−r5(n,f,t)) =l= 0;
264 ∗sold = prod
266 Sold(n,t).. sum(f, q_prod(n,f,t))− sum(m, q_sold(n,m,t)) =e= 0;
268 ∗flow = sold
270 Flow(n,m,t).. flow(n,m,t) − q_sold(n,m,t) =e= 0 ;
272 ∗Flow less than Max Flow
274 FlowCap(n,m,t).. −flow(n,m,t) − flow(m,n,t) + FCAP(n,m,t) + x(n,m)
+ x(m,n) =g= 0 ;
275 FlowCap2(n,m,t).. −flow(n,m,t) − flow(m,n,t) + FCAP(n,m,t) + x(n,m)
+ x(m,n) =l= K7a∗r7(n,m,t) ;
276 FlowCap3(n,m,t).. epsilon(n,m,t) − K7b∗(1−r7(n,m,t)) =l= 0 ;
278 ∗Market clearing
280 eqnMCC(n,t).. d(n,t) − sum(m, q_sold(m,n,t)) =e= 0;
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283 model it/all/;
286 option reslim = 18000;
287 option MINLP = BARON;
288 option optcr = 0.009
289 it.optfile = 1;
291 solve it using MINLP minimizing w1;
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D.3 Zonal Transmission Model Bilateral Cost Shar-
ing
1 Sets
2 n nodes /n1∗n4/
3 f fuels /f1∗f4/
4 t time /t1∗t2/
6 $ontext
7 nodes: 1 2 3 4
8 NO DK DENE GB
10 fuels: 1 2 3 4
11 Hydro Solar Wind Thermal
12 $offtext
14 alias (n,m,mm);
16 table A(n,t) Intercept of inverse demand curve in node n and time
t
17 ∗ 2010 2020
18 t1 t2
19 n1 0.580 0.580
20 n2 0.580 0.580
21 n3 0.580 0.580
22 n4 0.580 0.580
23 ;
25 table B(n,t) Slope of inverse demand curve in node n and time t
26 ∗ 2010 2020
27 t1 t2
28 n1 0.035 0.034
29 n2 0.124 0.117
30 n3 0.008 0.009
31 n4 0.014 0.014
32 ;
34 ∗UNIT: EUR/GW
35 table CG(n,f,t) Generation cost for fuel f in node n (Equal for
all time periods)
36 ∗ 2010 2020
37 t1 t2
38 n1.f1 0.04 0.047
39 n1.f2 0 0
40 n1.f3 0 0
41 n1.f4 0.043 0.052
43 n2.f1 0.040 0.047
44 n2.f2 0 0
45 n2.f3 0 0
46 n2.f4 0.043 0.052
48 n3.f1 0.040 0.047
49 n3.f2 0 0
50 n3.f3 0 0
51 n3.f4 0.043 0.052
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53 n4.f1 0.040 0.047
54 n4.f2 0 0
55 n4.f3 0 0
56 n4.f4 0.043 0.052
57 ;
59 $ontext
60 Unit: GW
61 Fuels: 1 2 3 4
62 Hydro Solar Wind Thermal
63 $offtext
65 table GCAP(n,f,t) Generation capacity of fuel f in node n in time t. (
Equal for all time periods)
66 ∗ Winter Summer Winter Summer
67 t1 t2
68 n1.f1 28.37 42
69 n1.f2 0.01 0.03
70 n1.f3 0.520 3
71 n1.f4 0.237 3.141
73 n2.f1 0.009 0.009
74 n2.f2 0.017 0.017
75 n2.f3 3.952 5
76 n2.f4 10.775 9
78 n3.f1 4.821 3.037
79 n3.f2 25.24 30.146
80 n3.f3 31.343 70
81 n3.f4 137.57 127.5
83 n4.f1 1.676 1.676
84 n4.f2 0.981 1
85 n4.f3 6.556 20
86 n4.f4 81.92 68
87 ;
90 table AV(n,f,t) Availability generation of type f in node n at time t.
91 ∗ 2010 2020
92 t1 t2
93 n1.f1 1 1
94 n1.f2 0.12 0.12
95 n1.f3 0.2935 0.2935
96 n1.f4 1 1
97 n2.f1 1 1
98 n2.f2 0.12 0.12
99 n2.f3 0.2935 0.2935
100 n2.f4 1 1
101 n3.f1 1 1
102 n3.f2 0.12 0.12
103 n3.f3 0.2935 0.2935
104 n3.f4 1 1
105 n4.f1 1 1
106 n4.f2 0.12 0.12
107 n4.f3 0.2935 0.2935
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108 n4.f4 1 1
109 ;
111 ∗UNIT: GW
112 table FCAP(n,m,t) Invested capacity on line between node n and m in
time t
113 ∗ 2010 2020
114 t1 t2
115 n1.n1 200 200
116 n1.n2 1.000 1.000
117 n1.n3 0.7 0.7
118 n1.n4 0 0
119 n2.n1 1.000 1.000
120 n2.n2 200 200
121 n2.n3 2.1 2.1
122 n2.n4 0 0
123 n3.n1 0.7 0.7
124 n3.n2 2.1 2.1
125 n3.n3 200 200
126 n3.n4 1.000 1.000
127 n4.n1 0 0
128 n4.n2 0 0
129 n4.n3 1.000 1.000
130 n4.n4 200 200
131 ;
133 ∗UNIT: EUR/GWH
134 table CL(n,m) Investment cost if node 1 is LEADER
135 ∗ NOR DK DENE UK
136 n1 n2 n3 n4
137 n1 10 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
138 n2 10 10 0.0017 0.0017
139 n3 10 10 10 10
140 n4 10 10 10 10
141 ;
144 Parameter
145 K1a /0.06/
146 K1b /70/
147 K2a /1/
148 K2b /70/
149 K3a /1/
150 K3b /70/
151 K4a /1/
152 K4b /70/
153 K5a /150/
154 K5b /1/
155 K6a /10/
156 K6b /100/
157 K7a /200/
158 K7b /0.1/
159 ;
161 Variables
162 w1
163 p_el(n,t) Dual of demand constraint
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164 p_t(n,m,t)
165 phi(n,t)
166 ;
168 Positive Variables
169 x(n,m) MWs invested on line between node n to node m in
time period t
170 q_prod(n,f,t) MWs generated from fuel f at node n in time period t
171 q_sold(n,m,t) MWs sold from node n to node m in time period t
172 d(n,t) Demand in node n at time t
173 flow(n,m,t) Flow on line from node n to node m in time period t
174 gamma(n,f,t)
175 epsilon(n,m,t)
176 ;
178 Binary variables
179 r1(n,t)
180 r2(n,f,t)
181 r3(n,m,t)
182 r4(n,m,t)
183 r5(n,f,t)
184 r6(n,m)
185 r7(n,m,t)
186 ;
188 ∗Fixing variables in order to speed up solution
189 r6.fx(n,m)$(ord(n) > ord(m)) = 1;
191 equations
192 eqnWelfare1
193 eqnX(n,m)
194 eqnObjDemand(n,t)
195 eqnObjDemand2(n,t)
196 eqnObjDemand3(n,t)
198 eqnObjProd(n,f,t)
199 eqnObjProd2(n,f,t)
200 eqnObjProd3(n,f,t)
202 eqnObjSold(n,m,t)
203 eqnObjSold2(n,m,t)
204 eqnObjSold3(n,m,t)
206 eqnObjFlow(n,m,t)
207 eqnObjFlow2(n,m,t)
208 eqnObjFlow3(n,m,t)
210 eqnObjX(n,m)
211 eqnObjX2(n,m)
212 eqnObjX3(n,m)
214 eqnGenCap(n,f,t)
215 eqnGenCap2(n,f,t)
216 eqnGenCap3(n,f,t)
218 eqnSold(n,t)
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220 eqnFlow(n,m,t)
222 eqnFlowCap(n,m,t)
223 eqnFlowCap2(n,m,t)
224 eqnFlowCap3(n,m,t)
226 eqnMCC(n,t)
227 ;
229 ∗Leader’s problem: Maximize his own welfare
230 eqnWelfare1.. w1 =e= sum(t, − 0.5∗ B(’n1’,t)∗d(’n1’,t)∗d(’n1’,t))
231 + sum((t,f), CG(’n1’,f,t)∗q_prod(’n1’,f,t))
232 − sum((m,t), q_sold(’n1’,m,t)∗p_el(m,t))
233 − sum((m,t), flow(’n1’,m,t) ∗p_t(’n1’,m,t))
234 + 0.5∗sum((m), CL(’n1’,m)∗x(’n1’,m));
236 eqnX(n,m).. x(’n1’,m) =l= 100;
237 ∗Market problem: Maximizing market welfare
239 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to d(n)
240 eqnObjDemand(n,t).. −A(n,t) + B(n,t)∗d(n,t) + p_el(n,t) =g= 0 ;
241 eqnObjDemand2(n,t).. −A(n,t) + B(n,t)∗d(n,t) + p_el(n,t) =l= K1a∗r1(n,t);
242 eqnObjDemand3(n,t).. d(n,t) − K1b∗(1−r1(n,t)) =l= 0 ;
244 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to q_prod
245 eqnObjProd(n,f,t).. CG(n,f,t) + gamma(n,f,t) + phi(n,t) =g= 0;
246 eqnObjProd2(n,f,t).. CG(n,f,t) + gamma(n,f,t) + phi(n,t) =l= K2a∗r2(n,f,
t);
247 eqnObjProd3(n,f,t).. q_prod(n,f,t) − K2b∗(1−r2(n,f,t)) =l= 0;
249 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to q_sold
250 eqnObjSold(n,m,t).. −phi(n,t) − p_t(n,m,t) − p_el(m,t) =g= 0;
251 eqnObjSold2(n,m,t).. −phi(n,t) − p_t(n,m,t) − p_el(m,t) =l= K3a∗r3(n,m,t);
252 eqnObjSold3(n,m,t).. q_sold(n,m,t) − K3b∗(1−r3(n,m,t)) =l= 0;
254 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to flow
255 eqnObjFlow(n,m,t).. epsilon(n,m,t) + epsilon(m,n,t) + p_t(n,m,t) =g= 0;
256 eqnObjFlow2(n,m,t)..epsilon(n,m,t)+ epsilon(m,n,t) + p_t(n,m,t) =l= K4a∗r4
(n,m,t);
257 eqnObjFlow3(n,m,t).. flow(n,m,t) − K4b∗(1−r4(n,m,t)) =l= 0;
259 ∗KKT: Objective function derived with respect to investements x
260 eqnObjX(n,m).. 0.5∗CL(n,m) − sum(t, epsilon(n,m,t)) −sum(t, epsilon(m,n,t
)) =g= 0;
261 eqnObjX2(n,m).. 0.5∗CL(n,m) − sum(t, epsilon(n,m,t)) −sum(t, epsilon(m,n,t
)) =l= K6a∗r6(n,m);
262 eqnObjX3(n,m)$(ord(n) > 1).. x(n,m) =l= K6b∗(1−r6(n,m));
265 ∗q_prod less than Max Prod
266 eqnGenCap(n,f,t).. −q_prod(n,f,t) + GCAP(n,f,t)∗AV(n,f,t) =g= 0;
267 eqnGenCap2(n,f,t)..−q_prod(n,f,t) + GCAP(n,f,t)∗AV(n,f,t) =l= K5a∗r5(n,f,t
);
268 eqnGenCap3(n,f,t).. gamma(n,f,t) − K5b∗(1−r5(n,f,t)) =l= 0;
270 ∗sold = prod
271 eqnSold(n,t).. sum(f, q_prod(n,f,t))− sum(m, q_sold(n,m,t)) =e= 0;
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273 ∗flow = sold
274 eqnFlow(n,m,t).. flow(n,m,t) − q_sold(n,m,t) =e= 0 ;
276 ∗Flow less than Max Flow
277 eqnFlowCap(n,m,t).. −flow(n,m,t) − flow(m,n,t) + FCAP(n,m,t) + x(n,m) +
x(m,n) =g= 0 ;
278 eqnFlowCap2(n,m,t).. −flow(n,m,t) − flow(m,n,t) + FCAP(n,m,t) + x(n,m) +
x(m,n) =l= K7a∗r7(n,m,t) ;
279 eqnFlowCap3(n,m,t).. epsilon(n,m,t) − K7b∗(1−r7(n,m,t)) =l= 0 ;
281 ∗Market clearing
282 eqnMCC(n,t).. d(n,t) − sum(m, q_sold(m,n,t)) =e= 0;
284 model it /all/;
286 option reslim = 28800;
287 option MINLP = BARON;
288 option optcr = 0.00009;
289 it.optfile = 1;
291 solve it using MINLP minimizing w1;
Appendix E
Content on Enclosed CD
1. Excel spreadsheet with input data
2. GAMS code for the Supranational Planning Model
3. GAMS code for the Zonal Planning Model
4. GAMS code for the Zonal Planning Model and Bilateral Cost
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